



UKRAINE MONTHLY ECONOMIC UPDATE

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In its *Ukraine Monthly Economic Update*, KSE Institute assesses the **state of Ukraine's economy** across the real sector, external accounts, public finances, prices, monetary policy, exchange rate, banking system, and labor market. Each section closes with a **KSE Institute comment**, which sets out the Institute's own reading and forward view; these are our judgments and distinct from the reported data. The underlying series and their sources are presented in the statistical annex. The data and events **cut-off date is September 25, 2026**.

The key takeaways from KSE Institute's *September 2026 Ukraine Monthly Economic Update* are:

- **The port blockade is now visible in the external accounts.** Goods exports fell 7.1% y-o-y in July, and the trade deficit reached USD 6.0 billion, the largest this year. The current account was close to balance only because official transfers from the EU reached USD 5.3 billion. In August, exports fell further and reserves declined 5.0% to USD 48.7 billion. We expect the trade deficit to widen through year-end and to be financed by partner support, since imports are dominated by defense and energy needs.
- **The government's cash position deteriorated sharply in August.** Revenues fell short of plan, the general fund deficit reached UAH 163 billion, and borrowing covered only UAH 36.8 billion of it, so government deposits at the NBU fell by UAH 336 billion, or 47%. With attacks narrowing the tax base, the financing of priority expenditures in Q4 depends on the tranches arrival, highly conditional on the reform delivery.
- **Inflation accelerated to 8.1% y-o-y in August, and the seasonal decline in food prices conceals stronger underlying pressure.** Core inflation held at 8.1% for a third month, seasonally adjusted annualized headline inflation reached 10.2%, and household inflation expectations jumped to 14.1%. We expect headline inflation to exceed 10% before year-end and to reach about 11% at end-2026, with risks on the upside.
- **The NBU raised the key policy rate to 16% on September 17, but the transmission to market remains soft.** With the new tender design partly offsetting hikes, the rate on three-month certificate of deposit stood only slightly above its pre-July level. As household inflation expectations climbed, the real after-tax return on a new deposit has turned negative. Although the NBU's guidance has become two-sided, we do not rule out a further 0.5 pp increase if inflation approaches the attention threshold of ~10% amid FX pressure build-ups.
- **Bank lending accelerated in August, but deposit growth slowed.** Net loans rose to UAH 1.32 trillion (+4.3% m-o-m, +34% y-o-y), while deposits added only 0.1% m-o-m, partly for seasonal reasons, with the entire increase coming from households' FX deposits. Households also added to their government bonds holdings. The non-performing loan ratio fell to 12.1% in July, but the sectors most exposed to the strikes hold close to four fifths of hryvnia corporate loans, and we expect asset quality to deteriorate first in trade.
- **The hryvnia appreciation in August appears largely bought.** USD/UAH fell from its August peak of 44.87 to 44.54. Part of the move reflected global dollar weakness. Market pressure did not ease, with the client-market deficit staying near its record at USD 3.5 billion, and household FX demand rose 38% m-o-m. Net interventions reached USD 4.8 billion, and weekly sales kept climbing as the hryvnia strengthened, reversing the June–July pattern. Keeping the hryvnia this strong is costly and depends on timely external financing.
- **The loss of production capacity has been added to the port blockade as a constraint.** Industrial output fell 1.7% y-o-y in July, as growth in defense-related machinery no longer offset the decline in metallurgy. Steel output fell 57.3% y-o-y in August, and the three plants that account for about 90% of steel capacity suspended production after missile strikes. Q2 GDP growth was revised to 0.4% y-o-y from 0.6%.
- **Russian strikes on warehouses and production facilities have started to reduce hiring, but the shortage persists.** The average wage was USD 721 in July (+16.7% y-o-y in real terms), and vacancies fell 5.5% in early September as major employers cut staff, yet difficulty to find a labor is persistent, so as the wage pressure.
- **In August the government adopted new recovery frameworks.** Minimum agricultural export prices were cut by 28.6%, and public-private partnership screening became part of public investment planning. The main autumn risks are linked to air defense capabilities and non-timely support amid slow reform delivery.

EXTERNAL SECTOR

Ukraine's **goods trade deficit** widened to **USD 6.0 billion** in July, the largest this year, and to **USD 37.0 billion** over January–July, **USD 10.5 billion**, or 40%, more than a year earlier. **Goods exports** fell 7.1% y-o-y to **USD 2.9 billion**, the first annual decline in 2026 and the lowest monthly level since June 2024, with **agriculture** down 6.9% and **metals** down 15.2%. Cumulative exports, **USD 22.6 billion**, rose only 2.8%, and all of the growth came from agriculture (+8.9%; 62.4% of the basket against 58.9% for similar period in 2025). Non-agricultural exports were **USD 0.5 billion** (-5.8%) lower, led by **machinery** (-25%), **mineral products** (-12%), and **metals** (-6%). **Imports**, **USD 59.6 billion**, rose 23.0% (+15.0% in July). **Machinery and equipment** hit a record **USD 4.4 billion** in July, 49.3% of the monthly bill, and supplied almost two-thirds of the **USD 11.2 billion** cumulative increase (+40.7%), followed by **mineral products** (+44.1%). **Services exports** were **USD 9.6 billion** against **imports** of **USD 14.4 billion**, a **deficit** of **USD 4.9 billion**, while the **primary income balance** was **USD -1.0 billion**.

The **current account** was close to balance in July (**USD -0.05 billion** against USD -4.2 billion a year earlier). A **USD 5.5 billion** y-o-y jump in **secondary income**, driven by EU grants, more than offset a USD 1.4 billion wider deficit in goods and services. Of the USD 6.7 billion in July secondary income, USD 5.3 billion were official transfers to the general government, mostly the USD 5.1 billion **USL defense tranche** received from the EU in July, which the NBU records as a grant. Cumulatively, the **deficit** narrowed to **USD 11.4 billion** from USD 20.6 billion, but only because **official transfers** rose 3.9 times to USD 23.9 billion; excluding them, it widened 32% to USD 35.3 billion. **Non-resident inflows** fell to **USD 10.1 billion** (-55%), with **loans to the public sector** down to **USD 5.4 billion** from USD 18.0 billion, while **FDI** held at **USD 1.3 billion** in January–July (+4.5%). **Resident capital outflows** rose to **USD 7.4 billion** (+30%), but USD 6.7 billion of that was the NBU placing earmarked partner funds in non-reserve assets. Excluding the central bank, outflows fell to USD 0.7 billion from USD 4.9 billion.

KSE Institute comment

External financing is both covering the trade gap and widening it. USL-financed defense procurement and budget spending feed directly into import demand, which is why machinery reached almost half of the July import bill. The near-balanced current account therefore hides a sharp deterioration in trade imbalances. It also reflects the broader picture: for now, grants cover those imbalances, financing 57% of the January–July goods and services deficit. Part of this money reaches reserves only with a lag. The NBU does not count USL defense funds in international reserves because their use is restricted; it holds them as deposits abroad (USD 6.7 billion in January–July), and they enter reserves only when the government sells them to the NBU for hryvnia.

The export shock is now in the data, and August is expected to be worse. Preliminary customs data imply August exports of about USD 2.5 billion, which left January–August exports flat y-o-y at USD 26.6 billion after 4% growth through July. Alternative routes cannot carry the volume. The NBU assumed about 2.5 million tons of agricultural exports per month in August–October, against a normal 4–4.5 million, yet only 1.42 million tons left on August 1–26, with rail and the Danube carrying about 0.6 million each. Rail itself is a target: by late August, 492 locomotives had been damaged since February 2022, more than 250 of them in the previous six months, and the first new Alstom units are not due until early 2027. Traffic at Greater Odesa partly resumed in late August, but cargo volumes stayed three to four times below pre-attack levels, and the Ukrainian Agrarian Council has advised exporters to plan on the assumption that deep-water operations at Greater Odesa will not resume before December–January. On September 16, the Joint War Committee extended its listed area to almost the entire Black Sea, so vessels on the Danube route now also carry war-risk premiums, adding to the cost of the alternative corridor. A closure through December would therefore roughly exhaust the NBU estimate on grain alone.

Metallurgy, once the second pillar of exports, has been largely destroyed as an export driver. Metal exports fell from USD 15.7 billion in 2021 (24.7% of goods exports) to USD 4.7 billion in 2025, and to 10.9% of

the basket in January–July 2026. August accelerated the collapse. Zaporizhstal halted after strikes on August 11 and 27, and ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih was also hit; together the two plants produce about 72% of Ukraine's steel. KametStal stopped after an attack in early September. Steel output fell 57.3% y-o-y in August to 277,000 tons, the weakest month since December 2022, and EU quota cuts and CBAM compound the loss. Recently, Metinvest stated that during September there was a first time in 100 years that Ukrainian metallurgy produced zero tons of steel during a week.

Import demand will not ease. The import bill is increasingly set by procurement financed under the defense component of the USL, and those funds are flowing quickly: the Commission's fourth defense payment, EUR 3.3 billion (USD 3.8 billion) on September 18, brought its payments to Ukraine since January to nearly EUR 15 billion (USD 17.1 billion). Strikes on Naftogaz production assets continued into September, so energy imports add to the bill, together with lost metal production substitution by imports. A gap of this size can only be closed by sustained and predictable external financing.

August showed how quickly the buffer thins when conversions lag imports. Reserves fell 5.0% to USD 48.7 billion. NBU net FX sales of USD 4.8 billion were offset by only USD 0.9 billion of government FX receipts and USD 1.6 billion of converted USL defense funds, and import cover fell to 4.0 months (that is still above the conventional three-month adequacy benchmark, but the direction matters).

FISCAL SECTOR

In August, **revenues of the state budget general fund** amounted to **UAH 227.8 billion** (USD 5.1 billion), reaching 93.6% of the monthly plan. The revenue shortfall was primarily driven by two factors. First, Russia's systematic attacks on warehouses, logistics hubs, ports, other critical infrastructure, and businesses disrupted production and supply chains, weakened economic activity, and consequently narrowed the domestic tax base. Second, lower-than-expected taxable import volumes constrained revenues from taxes on imported goods. **General fund expenditures** reached **UAH 390 billion** (USD 8.7 billion), equivalent to 89.0% of the revised monthly plan. During the month, the expenditure plan was increased by UAH 19.7 billion, while part of the initially planned spending was shifted to subsequent months. Had the original monthly plan remained unchanged, expenditure execution would have stood at 93.2%, implying a 6.8% shortfall. The **general fund deficit** is estimated at **UAH 163 billion** (USD 3.6 billion), 16.6% below the planned level. Budget financing was supported by **domestic** borrowing of **UAH 32.6 billion** (USD 0.7 billion) and **external** borrowing of **UAH 4.2 billion** (USD 0.1 billion). Key external sources included **UAH 2.7 billion** (USD 60 million) under the **World Bank's THRIVE program** and **UAH 1.48 billion** (USD 20.5 million) from the **Council of Europe Development Bank under the Heal Ukraine program**. Total **borrowing** in August amounted to **UAH 36.8 billion** (USD 0.8 billion). According to **NBU operational data**, government deposits with the NBU (hryvnia and FX accounts combined, Deposit Guaranty Fund's accounts excluded) fell by UAH 336.2 bn (–47.3% m-o-m) in August 2026, to UAH 375.1 bn. This fully reversed July's sharp build-up and brought the balance 17.1% below its end-2025 level (UAH 452.7 bn).

KSE Institute comment

Fiscal pressures became more pronounced in August as the effects of Russia's intensified attacks increasingly fed through to budget revenues. Damage to production, logistics, ports in particular, and other critical infrastructure, together with prolonged air alerts, continued to constrain business activity and weaken the domestic tax base. Revenue performance was also affected by lower net domestic VAT receipts, driven in particular by higher VAT refunds and weaker export dynamics, while lower taxable imports put additional pressure on revenues from imported goods. While some revenue sources, particularly corporate income tax

and resource rents, performed relatively well, these developments may prove difficult to sustain if disruptions to economic activity persist.

On the expenditure side, the main concern is shifting from monthly execution to the availability and timing of financial resources for the remainder of the year. The repeated revisions to the expenditure schedule indicate that part of the planned spending has been moved across months rather than permanently reduced. At the same time, spending plans for September–November are substantially lower than the average monthly level earlier in the year, with the sharpest adjustment affecting the Ministry of Defence. This increases the risk of temporary underfunding of priority expenditures and leaves less room to absorb further shocks without reallocating resources between budget programmes.

Financing conditions also point to growing pressure on the government's cash position. In August, the Ministry of Finance raised little new domestic funding, while external disbursements in August remained limited. At the same time, debt repayments and servicing exceeded new borrowing during the month (80% rollover of hryvnia borrowing). Domestic debt exchanges can help smooth the repayment profile and reduce short-term refinancing pressure, but they do not eliminate the underlying financing needs. Predictable external support therefore remains important for maintaining fiscal stability and reducing pressure on domestic borrowing, which remains an important buffer for government's cash position.

In September, the Government submitted the draft State Budget for 2027 to the Verkhovna Rada, setting out the fiscal framework for the next budget year amid continued high defence and financing needs. The draft envisages a further increase in total expenditure, with defence remaining the dominant spending priority, while substantial international financing is incorporated into the budget framework. KSE Institute has prepared a [detailed analysis](#) of the draft budget, covering its key parameters, spending priorities, financing structure, and major fiscal risks.

Looking ahead, fiscal risks remain elevated in the final months of the year. Continued attacks on economic and critical infrastructure could further weaken the tax base, while constrained spending schedules may create difficulties in financing defence and other priority commitments. If external financing is not received on time and domestic resources prove insufficient, the government may need to rely more heavily on reallocations, postponements of lower-priority spending, and potentially part of the Ukraine Support Loan resources currently planned for 2027. Such measures could ease near-term pressure but would increase financing constraints in the following budget period.

INFLATION

Annual **headline inflation** accelerated to **8.1% y-o-y** in August from 7.7% in July, while **core inflation** remained unchanged for the third consecutive month at **8.1%**. In monthly terms, prices increased by 0.1% m-o-m, as the harvest-driven fall in food prices offset increases in other components; core CPI rose by **8.1% y-o-y** (0.5% m-o-m). Industrial **producer-price inflation** slightly slowed to **37.3% y-o-y** (42.5% in July).

Food and non-alcoholic beverage prices fell by -1.3% m-o-m (the steepest monthly decline this year), bringing the annual figure down to **6.0%** from 6.5% in July. **Raw-food inflation** slowed to **1.0% y-o-y** from 2.2%. With the new crop arriving, annual **vegetable** prices growth dropped to **0.9%** from 7.8% in July. This is mainly explained by last year's early harvest that had impacted the July yearly comparison. Fruit and **eggs** saw the expected seasonal decline (**-11.3%** and **-24.1% y-o-y** respectively), and **meat** price growth slowed to **1.3%** from 2.4% amid ample supply. Sugar partly offset these decreases, with its fall narrowing to -5.1% from -8.1% y-o-y in July. In dairy, faster growth in cheese prices (**4.9% y-o-y**, from 4.6%) was balanced by cheaper butter (**-1.6%**, from -0.6%

y-o-y); milk price growth eased to **6.9%** from 8.0%. **Processed-food inflation** remained unchanged at **10.0% y-o-y**.

Services inflation eased to **13.4%** y-o-y from 13.7% in July, with communication inflation slowing to **13.6%** from 16.5%. By contrast, transport services accelerated to **35.9%** from 28.9% y-o-y, restaurants and hotels to **13.7%** from 13.2%, and rent to **12.2%** from 11.2%. **Non-food inflation** edged up to **1.1%** from 0.8%. **Administered prices** increased **13.0% y-o-y** from 11.8% after a third consecutive month of tariff revisions. Water-supply and sewerage prices were up **77.6%** and **73.6% y-o-y** respectively (from 52.1% and 48.8% in July), and road passenger transport fares rose **39.1% y-o-y** (from 30.8%), following fare increases in several cities. Household electricity, gas and central heating tariffs, meanwhile, stayed frozen at last year's levels. Tobacco and alcoholic beverages prices rose **23.7%** and **7.9% y-o-y** respectively (from 23.6% and 6.5% y-o-y in July). **Fuel inflation** ended two months of slowdown and returned to its May peak of **38.7% y-o-y**, up from 28.0%, after gasoline and diesel prices rose sharply at the end of July amid the spike in global oil prices. Fuel prices rose a further 8.1% m-o-m (**38.7% y-o-y**) in August as gasoline kept getting more expensive.

Twelve-month-ahead **household inflation expectations** rose to **14.1%** from 10.0% in July. **Analysts' expectations** are much less volatile, yet in September they increased to **8.3%**, after the 7.9% reading in July.

KSE Institute comment

Inflation remains persistent despite the temporary seasonal relief. The 8.1% y-o-y (0.1% m-o-m) increase does not fully capture the underlying pressure: based on our estimates, seasonally adjusted annualized headline inflation was at 10.2% in August with core inflation reaching 8.4% on a one-month basis, and 8.5% and 9.0% on the smoother three-month measure¹. Goods are increasingly absorbing the pass-through of production costs, while the slight slowdown in services mostly reflects a base effect in communication, as last year's August's increase in mobile tariffs (+3.3% m-o-m) no longer falls within the 12-month comparison period. At the same time, services inflation is likely to maintain the current trend, which is mainly driven by labor costs as firms facing labor shortages keep raising wages; according to IER, 69% of enterprises named labor scarcity as their main obstacle in August. The factors that restrained headline inflation in August are, by contrast, largely temporary, as the harvest-driven decline in food prices is seasonal. Core inflation's third month at 8.1% shows that the underlying pressure remains persistent: at this pace, disinflation would require a favorable supply shock, but the current supply-side developments point in the opposite direction.

Supply-side inflation risks are driven both by global energy prices and domestic disruptions. On the external side, fuel is again becoming a source of pressure, despite our earlier expectation that this channel would fade. Our previous baseline assumed that reopening the Strait of Hormuz would gradually ease fuel costs. That assumption no longer holds: the June US-Iran arrangement has unraveled, strikes resumed, and Brent is back above USD 100 per barrel, up from about USD 84 in mid-June. Producer-price inflation slowed in August (37.3% y-o-y, compared with 42.5% in July), reflecting the lagged pass-through of lower global fuel prices in June–July and exchange-rate stability. However, neither factor is expected to provide the same relief going forward. Domestically, intensified Russian strikes on logistics, production, and energy infrastructure are reducing supply and pushing up transportation, storage, and energy costs across the supply chain. Fuel and logistics costs pass through to transport fares, distribution, and processed goods with a lag. They will therefore remain both direct and second-round drivers.

The port blockade is currently the main disinflationary force, but it is limited, transitory, and costly. As noted in the previous Ukraine Monthly Economic Update, export difficulties leave more agricultural produce

¹ KSE Institute estimates based on State Statistics Service and NBU data. Monthly price levels are seasonally adjusted on log levels with X-13ARIMA-SEATS over a 2016-01–2026-08 sample, with 2022 neutralised through additive-outlier regressors, and annualised by compounding: $SAAR\ 1m = ((SA(t)/SA(t-1))^{12}-1)$, $SAAR\ 3m = ((SA(t)/SA(t-3))^{4}-1)$. End-of-sample estimates are preliminary and revised with each new month; the one-month series is volatile, so the three-month series is the better trend indicator

on the domestic market. Cheaper grain should gradually lower the prices of flour and bread, and reduce feed expenses for livestock production. This pass-through, however, will likely be partial and lagged, as labor, energy, and logistics account for most of the retail price of processed foods, while the most volatile raw-food items, such as vegetables, fruit, and dairy barely depend on exports. The blockade also works in the opposite direction: rerouting trade to rail and road raises transportation expenses, and lowers export revenues weigh on hryvnia. The burden falls on farmers, some of whom are selling below production costs. Weaker margins could lead them to reduce planted areas and investment. As a result, some of the disinflationary effects seen today could translate into tighter supply and food-price pressure in 2027. Should El Niño prove severe, higher global food and fertilizer prices would compound that risk.

The strikes could also weaken demand, creating some disinflationary pressure, but it is unlikely to offset the supply effect. Annual retail trade growth slowed to 7.6% in August. The seasonally adjusted level, however, still rose, likely supported by precautionary buying ahead of possible shortages. That support is temporary, and the mass strikes on shopping centers, which began only in August, have yet to show their full effect. Over the coming months, damage to enterprises could release workers and restrain bonuses and wage growth. Deteriorating sentiment, constant air-raid alerts, and the risk to retail premises could weigh further on consumer spending. Weaker demand, however, is unlikely to translate into much lower price pressures. Margins already look compressed: industrial producer prices are up 37.3% y-o-y, against just 1.1% for non-food consumer goods. Firms will therefore have little choice but to pass higher costs on to consumers, even at the expense of sales volumes. Pass-through also tends to accelerate in a high-inflation environment, where firms reprice more often and more readily follow their competitors. Meanwhile, labor shortages and the new booking rule are still pushing wages up, particularly at the bottom of the pay scale.

Administered prices rose as a step increase in the price level, however they will keep annual inflation elevated for the next twelve months. Administered prices are partly losing their role as a buffer after a year in which water, electricity, and gas tariffs for households were frozen, which helped the disinflation of 2025. Electricity and gas prices are likely to remain at the same level, according to the statement of the Minister of Energy. This puts downward pressure on the forecast, which had assumed a hike after the current freeze expires in October 2026. However, water tariffs have increased significantly in several cities, along with municipal transport costs. These increases are themselves partly driven by energy prices and repairs after attacks.

Headline inflation is projected to cross the 10% attention threshold, potentially further raising inflation expectations that have already begun to deteriorate. Underlying momentum near 9% annualized², second-round effects, and a low base (prices rose only 1.8% over September–December 2025) are enough to take headline inflation into double digits even without new shocks. The risk is that cost shocks could lead to a broader repricing across the economy, reinforce the adverse drift in already elevated expectations, and feed into a price spiral. Twelve-month-ahead household expectations have not fallen below 10% over the last 12 months, even as actual inflation declined from 13.2% in August 2025 to 7.2% in June 2026, so the slowing of inflation of the past year did not translate into much lower expectations. The gap between year-ahead inflation expectations and actual inflation swung from –3.1 pp in August 2025 to +6.0 pp in August 2026. So, in August 2025, households expected inflation to slow over the following year compared to the rate at that time; by August 2026, this had reversed, with households expecting inflation to accelerate. They have also become considerably more volatile: the average monthly change was about 2 pp in 2026 against 0.5 pp in 2025, with readings ranging from 10.0% to 14.4% within eight months. While such swings may partly reflect the difficulty

² KSE Institute estimates based on SSSU and NBU data. For headline inflation to reach 10% y-o-y in December 2026, consumer prices would need to rise by about 3.6% cumulatively over September–December, given 8.1% inflation in August and a 1.8% increase in prices over the same four months of 2025. Headline momentum of 8.5% annualized on a three-month basis corresponds to about 2.8% cumulatively over four months, leaving only around 0.8 pp to be accounted for by seasonality. KSE Institute estimates show that the cumulative seasonal contribution over September–December ranged from about 1.1% to 1.9% in 2016–2025, excluding 2022. If current momentum persists, this would imply year-end inflation of roughly 10.3–11.2%, even without additional shocks.

of administering surveys in wartime, its largest increases also coincided with the April–May fuel shock, and with the increased intensity of Russian attacks on the logistics infrastructure in August. Households usually react most strongly to the prices they see most often, and August's drivers, namely fuel, transport fares and water bills – are among the most visible. One more telling signal is that financial analysts' expectations rose to 8.3% in September, their highest since late 2023. Over the H1 2026, the steadiness of expectations of the professional groups suggested that the confidence in the framework was intact, and that argument is now weakening.

Risks to our baseline forecast are increasingly tilted upward. Renewed strikes on production, logistics, and energy infrastructure ahead of the heating season, higher-for-longer oil prices, and a weaker hryvnia could each add to price pressures. The exchange rate held steady in August but is likely to weaken over the coming months (see [Exchange Rate](#)). At the same time, intensified attacks could lower consumer demand through temporary job losses, weaker consumer sentiment, frequent air-raid alerts, and disruptions to retail activity, including attacks on supermarkets. This could provide some disinflationary offset, but is unlikely to fully counter the supply-side pressures. An extension of the current household electricity tariff freeze beyond October would also lower inflation temporarily, but defer the pressure into 2027.

MONETARY POLICY AND MONEY MARKET

On 17 September the NBU raised the **key policy rate (KPR)** by a further 0.5 pp to **16%** – a second consecutive hike after [July's move to 15.5%](#). The Board tied the decision to persistent fundamental price pressure, second-round effects of supply shocks, and a strengthening of medium-term pro-inflationary risks. This step is meant to sustain the appeal of hryvnia assets, support the sustainability of the FX market, and help control inflation expectations, returning inflation toward the 5% target over the policy horizon. Forward guidance turned two-sided: the NBU stands ready to deploy additional measures should risks to expectations intensify but signaled that a marked deterioration in the security situation – and with it a cooling of the labor market and consumer demand – could open the door to easing.

[The Summary of the discussion](#) held by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) showed the doves gaining ground: seven of the ten members present backed the hike to 16%, while three favored a hold, up from two of eleven in July. The hawks cited persistent fundamental price pressure, second-round effects of supply shocks, and mounting net FX demand, driven by less rhythmic international aid and export losses in metallurgy and agriculture weigh on the FX market. The doves countered that core inflation had stopped rising and that the cooling of activity was already visible in the data, from weaker third-quarter GDP and sharply worse business expectations to fewer new vacancies and slowing retail sales. On the path ahead, seven members see 16% as sufficient, with the NBU holding in the coming months before easing cautiously in 2027; two expect the October forecast to pencil in at least one more hike, and one sees room to start cutting before the end of 2026.

August was the first full month of the NBU's new **interest-rate operational design**, under which three-month certificates of deposit (CDs) are allotted at biweekly rate tenders with a pre-announced volume and a rate capped at "KPR + 3.5 pp" – 19% after the July hike. Both tenders were rationed: on 7 August the NBU allotted UAH 30 bn against 74 bids worth UAH 37.1 bn, satisfying 69 of them at a weighted-average rate of 18.71%; on 21 August it raised the offer to UAH 40 bn but met only 39 of 76 bids worth UAH 52.1 bn, widening unmet demand to ~23% of bids from ~19% and pulling the weighted-average rate down to 18.59%.

The **hryvnia structural liquidity surplus**³ contracted for a second month running: it averaged **UAH 621 bn** (-2% m-o-m, +37% y-o-y). **CDs** fell to **~UAH 627 bn** (-2% m-o-m), with the composition rotating back to the short end: **overnight CDs** added ~UAH 3 bn to **~UAH 445 bn**, while **three-month CDs** shed ~UAH 17 bn to **~UAH 182 bn**, cutting their **share of total CDs** to **~29%** from **~31%** in July – the first decline after three consecutive monthly gains, and the clearest imprint of tender rationing to date. Average **correspondent accounts (CAs)** eased to **~UAH 285 bn** (-1% m-o-m, +11% y-o-y), covering the cash part of required reserves with an average overplus of UAH 22 bn. On the flow side, **State Treasury Service (STS) operations** supplied +UAH 159 bn, well short of July's +UAH 202 bn, while **NBU FX sales** drained ~UAH 217 bn and **cash operations** a further ~UAH 4 bn – so the FX channel out-drained the fiscal impulse for a third month in a row. Over the past 12 months, however, the treasury channel has still supplied UAH 190 bn more liquidity than FX interventions have sterilized. Demand for **refinancing loans** stayed marginal at **~UAH 28 bn** (-10% y-o-y). Liquidity (CAs plus CDs plus vault cash) remained unevenly spread across bank groups in late July, the latest available reading: state-owned banks held ~40% of the stock, foreign-owned banks ~33% and private banks ~28%. State-owned banks dominate the most liquid components – ~52% of CAs and ~63% of vault cash – whereas in NBU CDs their share (~33%) trails that of foreign-owned banks (~37%). Private banks keep gaining ground, up from ~26% of total liquidity at end-May.

KSE Institute comment

After the July hike, the September move was expected, and the case for it has only firmed. In line with the NBU's forecast, we flagged another 0.5 pp step as highly likely, and the reasoning holds: price pressures remain elevated, the balance of risks is skewed upward, particularly amid intensified Russian strikes, the escalation of the war in the Middle East, and further deterioration in inflation expectations. Underlying momentum has not accelerated much, but it remains well above target (see [Inflation section](#)).

In August, the new tenders partly neutralized the tightening, but in September, the NBU appears to have calibrated them more cautiously. Overnight CDs were repriced one-for-one with the KPR to 15.5%, but in the three-month segment the July step had been more than given back by early September. Rationed tenders cleared at 18.71% and 18.59% in August, and the first September tender even undercut the pre-hike level at 18.24%. The spread over the KPR thus narrowed step by step from 3.5 pp to 3.21 pp, 3.09 pp, and 2.74 pp. If rationing drove the slide in August, September appears to have brought a change in stance. The 4 September tender was the first at which banks capped the placement themselves: the NBU offered almost exactly the amount that had fallen due a week earlier (UAH 25.0 bn against UAH 25.1 bn), and banks bid for just 90% of it. At the 18 September tender, the first under the new KPR, bids covered only 78% of matured CDs, down from 103% and 109% in August – a decline most likely explained by shrinking placement limits at some banks, as household hryvnia deposits stalled in August against a high base a year earlier. Since the NBU sees banks' spare limits and how they are used, its decision to offer close to the volume actually bid, leaving unmet demand at ~3% against 19–23% in August, points to a more cautious calibration that avoids pressing rates down. Given accelerating inflation and a tightening cycle under way, that looks like the right call – and a helpful one for transmission. With the cutoff rate at 19.29%, only 21 bp below the 19.5% ceiling, the weighted-average placement rate jumped 57 bp to 18.81%, slightly more than the KPR step, widening the spread over the KPR to 2.81 pp from 2.74 pp. Even so, after two hikes totaling 1 pp, the three-month rate at the margin stands just 0.31 pp above its pre-July level.

Transmission to market rates currently looks muted. A partially neutralized July impulse could hardly have been expected to elicit much of a response in so short a time, and the first signs appeared only in September. According to the NBU's own observations, some banks, mostly smaller ones, began raising deposit rates. [Daily reporting](#) confirms this only for longer-term deposits. Smoothed over five days to strip out one-day

³The structural liquidity surplus is calculated as the difference between the NBU's liabilities to banks (CDs) and banks' liabilities to the NBU (refinancing loans), adjusted for balances on banks' correspondent accounts net of the required reserves that cannot be covered by benchmark domestic government bonds in the given reserve maintenance period.

composition swings, the average rate on new household term hryvnia deposits has held in a 13.2–13.7% band since July, averaging 13.60% in July, slipping to 13.47% in August (13.53% excluding a single outlier day) and 13.53% so far in September. Only long-term deposits show a shift: flat at around 14.5–14.6% through July and August, their average rate edged up to ~14.8% in September. Government paper has barely moved, by the Ministry of Finance's choice: on constant-maturity curves the one-year point has added 5 bp since July, to 15.18% at the 22 September auction, and the February 2029 note 2 bp, to 16.10%. The Ministry doubled the one-year offer to UAH 2 bn and filled it at the unchanged yield, but sold under a third of the UAH 1 bn two-year offer, turning away about UAH 1 bn of bids priced above the cutoff, at up to 16.30%. In other words, investors were ready to pass the hike through to yields; the Ministry was not. Reserve-eligible benchmark paper even got cheaper to issue, clearing at 12.18%, 26 bp below the 1 September auction, which widened its yield discount to comparable market paper to ~3.9 pp from ~3.7 pp. Weighted-average lending rates remained volatile: the rate on new hryvnia corporate loans fell 0.57 pp to 15.35% in August and consumer rates 1.45 pp to 35.12%, though the corporate series jumped 0.9 pp in July, so moves of this size may reflect the way floating-rate loans enter the statistics, which adds cyclical swings to the weighted average, rather than genuine repricing.

Transmission may stay soft going forward. Two sources of uncertainty are rooted in the NBU's own policy. The first concerns the parameters of coming tenders: the NBU can vary both the volume on offer and the rate ceiling, so banks' interest costs on term hryvnia deposits are locked in, while their ability to park those funds in full and at an acceptable return is not. Even the MPC acknowledges that the new mechanism could weaken transmission to term deposit rates. The NBU is currently showing restraint, but banks will need time to be convinced that it will last. The second is the recent two-sided forward guidance: if banks read it as signaling readiness for a quick reversal once consumer demand and the labor market cool noticeably, they have that much less reason to hurry in passing the tightening through to deposit rates. Another obstacle lies in government debt management: higher yields on hryvnia government bonds would intensify competition among banks for term hryvnia savings and support the appeal of hryvnia assets, but auction results and the Ministry of Finance's own communications show that it is unwilling to pay more – even though the Finance Minister calls the budget situation the most difficult since 2022.

A pre-announced rule for tender volumes, which the MPC agreed to consider, would only partially ease this uncertainty. The proposal ties the volume on offer to a fixed utilization rate of banks' aggregate limit. Its effect would hinge on the NBU's commitment to keeping the rule unchanged for long enough; otherwise, the target utilization rate would itself become just another source of uncertainty. Even a stable rule would link deposits to CD capacity for the system as a whole, not for an individual bank: a bank's deposit growth would raise the offer for all bidders, and it would secure its share only by conceding on rate, at the expense of its margin. The aggregate limit, and hence the offer, would also remain hard to forecast, given volatile deposit inflows, the 3.5 multiplier that amplifies every forecasting error, and the lack of public data on the term deposits that determine the limits, the limits themselves, and their utilization. Meanwhile, accepted rates at recent tenders have spanned as much as 1 pp, while banks lock in deposit costs upfront. The underlying tension is that, amid a structural liquidity surplus, competition for term deposits requires certainty over placement, whereas competition at CD auctions relies on uncertainty. Reducing the structural surplus could serve both goals; otherwise, the NBU will have to prioritize one of them.

Amid roughly flat market interest rates, deteriorating expectations are squeezing the relative appeal of hryvnia savings. With household inflation expectations rising to 14.1%, the real after-tax return on a new retail term deposit turned negative again, at about -3.7% against +0.5% in July. Household behavior is already bending. Retail hryvnia deposits were flat over the month and, even adjusted for a seasonally weak August, grew visibly slower than in June and July. Retail FX deposits rose by UAH 7.4 bn, and net household FX demand climbed 38% m-o-m as exchange-rate expectations drifted higher and the NBU eased some FX restrictions. Meanwhile, households also added to their government bond holdings (+4.4% m-o-m), as tax-exempt non-reserve government paper still returned roughly +1.8% in real terms.

Risks to inflation expectations and price dynamics stay tilted to the upside, so we do not rule out another hike in 4Q 2026 – early 2027. The KPR now sits exactly on the NBU's July forecast baseline, which holds it at 16% through Q1 2027 before easing begins in April 2027. With inflation climbing further, fuel costs under renewed pressure, and Russian strikes on energy, logistics and manufacturing intensifying, risks to both our and the NBU's inflation profiles are skewed upward. That could well justify a further 0.5 pp of tightening around the turn of the year – the more so if inflation approaches the attention threshold of around 10% while FX-market pressure builds further, compounded by any delays in international aid. Such delays would also sharpen a fiscal risk: with the Treasury short of cash, the Minister of Finance has not ruled out monetary financing of the deficit should the shortfall persist, acknowledging that it would weaken the hryvnia and fuel inflation – a signal that works against the anchoring of expectations the NBU is trying to restore, not least through KPR hikes.

Yet the ambivalence of the September guidance makes the NBU's next steps harder to read. Further strikes and a cooling fiscal impulse could produce a slowdown in consumer demand and the labor market in the coming months. Although the NBU sees risks to inflation shifting upward and the MPC's views on the path ahead are, if anything, tilted slightly hawkish (two members expecting another hike against one seeing an earlier cut), it nonetheless opted for two-sided guidance – a sign that the doves' arguments carried more weight than the headcount implies. With the decisiveness of the July move softened by a two-handed September signal, it has become harder to rule out that the NBU looks through an inflation spike, holding the rate. The real rate leaves formal room for such flexibility: with the KPR at 16%, the real policy rate stands at about 7.9% ex post and 1.9–7.7% ex ante across respondent groups, the ex-ante floor having collapsed as household expectations jumped. So do the Monetary Policy Guidelines reaffirmed by the NBU Council in early September: on the one hand, they name price stability as the key priority, to be pursued with all available instruments, including interest-rate and exchange-rate policy; on the other, they keep the NBU in flexible inflation targeting, free to balance support for recovery against control of expectations so long as inflation returns to the 5% target within a horizon of up to three years – a horizon that is exceptionally hard to see across in wartime.

BANKING SECTOR

Capital and liquidity ratios stayed above regulatory minimums in August, although both eased: **regulatory capital adequacy** slipped to **17.0%** from 17.2%, and the median **net stable funding ratio (NSFR)** returned to **179%** from an unusually high 193% in July, while the median **liquidity coverage ratio (LCR)** in all currencies held at **267%**. Profitability was broadly unchanged, with **ROE** at **22.1%** and **ROA** at **2.7%**. Lending accelerated for a third month: **net loans** reached **UAH 1.32 tn** (+4.3% m-o-m, +34% y-o-y), with **net corporate loans** at **UAH 933 bn** (+4.3% m-o-m) and **net retail loans** at **UAH 375 bn** (+4.6% m-o-m) – the retail book now growing faster than the corporate one. **Net hryvnia corporate loans** added UAH 25.9 bn to **UAH 652 bn** (+33% y-o-y), and **net hryvnia retail loans** reached **UAH 374 bn** (+38% y-o-y). The **5-7-9% program** portfolio rose 2.3% m-o-m to **UAH 203 bn** (+37% y-o-y). **New hryvnia loan rates** fell, to **15.4%** from 15.9% **for businesses** and to **35.1%** from 36.6% **for consumers**. Loan quality improved again in July (latest available): the aggregate **non-performing loan (NPL) ratio** fell to **12.1%** from 12.5%, declining across all bank groups, including state-owned (**17.7%**). **Deposits** stalled at **UAH 3.32 tn** (+0.1% m-o-m, +16% y-o-y) in August. **Corporate hryvnia deposits** lost UAH 2.0 bn and **retail hryvnia deposits** were flat at **UAH 1.02 tn**, so the entire monthly increase came from retail FX deposits (+UAH 7.4 bn), lifting **retail deposit dollarization** to **33.3%** while the **corporate** ratio held at **24.9%**. The **share of term deposits** in retail hryvnia deposits recovered to **34.3%** in July (latest available) from 33.9%, with state-owned banks holding 56% of that money. **New retail term-deposit rates** eased to **13.5%** in August from 13.6% while **corporate rates** firmed to **10.5%**, narrowing the retail-corporate spread to 2.9 pp. **Household portfolios of hryvnia OVDs** averaged **UAH 100 bn** (+81% y-o-y, +3.8 m-o-m), while their foreign-currency bonds grew faster

over the month (+5.4% m-o-m) to UAH 62 bn. On the primary market, the weighted average yield on hryvnia OVDs excluding reserve-eligible and prospective benchmark issues was little changed at 15.9%, on a longer average tenor of 2.4 years against 2.1 a month earlier; the all-issue average fell to 13.9% on a switch auction and benchmark placements priced well below the market.

KSE Institute comment

Demand carried corporate lending in August. We flagged last month that the subsidized channel was doing more work than its stock share implied and that the market-driven read should be treated as provisional. August settles part of that question: the 5-7-9% portfolio grew 2.3% against 4.1% for the hryvnia corporate book as a whole and supplied less than a fifth of the monthly increment, against roughly a third in June and July. As a result, its share of the book edged down to 29.4% as lending nonetheless accelerated amid a fall in new corporate loan rates by 0.5 pp. The August extension of the 5-7-9 program to working-capital loans for farmers has not yet appeared in the numbers, so the subsidized share is likely to rise again in the autumn.

The sectoral mix of new lending is shifting toward what the war is currently damaging, and that is where asset quality will be tested next. Sectoral data for July (latest available), show electricity and gas taking UAH 8.3 bn of the UAH 27.6 bn monthly increase in hryvnia corporate loans, leaving that book 55% above its year-earlier level ahead of a heating season the sector may not get through intact. Energy is no longer the only target, however. Strikes through the summer moved onto commercial warehousing and distribution and onto the ports and rail links that carry agricultural and metals exports, so the damage now reaches most of the loan book rather than one corner of it: trade, agriculture, and manufacturing together hold close to 79% of hryvnia corporate loans. Two consecutive months of falling non-performing loan ratios, therefore, describe the seasoning of the existing portfolio rather than the risk being currently written. We would expect the improvement to stall first in trade, where the loss is to inventory and distribution and feeds through short working-capital cycles, and only later in agriculture and metals, where it works through export volumes and prices.

The August slowdown in deposit inflows is real, albeit milder than the headline suggests. Household hryvnia deposits were flat over the month at UAH 1.02 tn. August, however, is seasonally weak: over the past decade household hryvnia balances fell about 1.1% in an average August, and 0.7% over the past three years. So, adjusted for seasonality⁴, balances still grew 0.6% m-o-m, an annualized 8%. That is not a stop yet, but a visible deceleration: seasonally adjusted growth ran near 1.4% a month in June and July, with an annualized pace at 17-19%. The three-month average annualized pace slipped more smoothly from 16% to 15%. What changed is where the marginal hryvnia went. Households added foreign currency both as deposits (+UAH 7.4 bn) and as FX-denominated government bonds (+5.4% m-o-m), while the average rate on new term deposits drifted down 0.13 pp. Long-term deposit rates edged up only marginally in August, to 14.57% from 14.45% in June, while short-term rates slipped below their July level; however, the long end picked up more visibly only in September, to ~14.8%. This suggests that banks are defending the hryvnia deposit franchise selectively rather than across the board.

⁴Seasonally adjusted by KSE Institute with X-13ARIMA-SEATS (X-11 filters, multiplicative, ARIMA (3 1 1)(0 1 1), automatic outlier detection). Seasonal factors are estimated on 2015M12-2026M08; identifiable seasonality is confirmed (Q = 0.45). Estimates for the most recent months are subject to revision as new observations arrive.

EXCHANGE RATE

In August, the hryvnia firmed against the US dollar. The official USD/UAH rate averaged **44.69**, only marginally below July (-0.03% m-o-m). But the intramonth path was rather directional: after peaking at **44.87** on 12 August, the exchange rate (ER) declined steadily to **44.54** by 28 August. The fluctuation band narrowed to **44.54–44.87** (0.32 UAH against 0.45 in July). Official EUR/UAH moved the other way, averaging **51.76** (+1.4% m-o-m) and peaking at **52.25** on 24 August, as the euro strengthened globally. In the first ten days of September, the hryvnia held its gains: the official USD/UAH averaged 44.59, moving within 44.46–44.73 and touching its lowest level since early June on 2 September. EUR/UAH fluctuated within 51.54–51.99.

Household behavior diverged from the USD/UAH path. Household net FX demand rose to **USD 26.8 million** per day (+38% m-o-m, +68% y-o-y) in August. The composition shifted: cash demand edged down by USD 0.4 million to USD 21.3 million per day (still +31% y-o-y), while the non-cash segment flipped to net purchases of USD 5.4 million per day from net sales of USD 2.3 million in July. The cash-official ER spread widened to **0.59%** from 0.46% in July, as the average cash rate edged higher while the official rate eased. ER expectations deteriorated in parallel: households raised their one-year-ahead USD/UAH projection to **47.4** in the August round from 46.4 in July, while financial analysts moved to **47.3** in the September round from 47.1 in July.

Client operations told the same story. Average daily FX purchases rose to USD 405 million (+6% m-o-m, +39% y-o-y), the highest monthly average of 2026, while sales rose more slowly to USD 238 million (+3% m-o-m). As a result, the daily average gap widened to **USD 168 million** from USD 152 million. In monthly terms, the client-market deficit reached **USD 3.5 billion**, broadly unchanged from July, but still the second-largest of 2026, even though liquidity injections from government spending fell to UAH 159 billion (-21% m-o-m, but +67% y-o-y), or about USD 3.6 billion-equivalent.

The NBU met this gap with one of its heaviest intervention efforts of the year. Net FX interventions reached **USD 4.8 billion** (+0.5% m-o-m, +79% y-o-y). As turnover between banks without the NBU fell to USD 3.2 billion, the NBU's share of interbank turnover exceeded **60%**. International reserves stood at **USD 48.7 billion** as of 1 September, down 5.0% over the month, as external inflows halved while interventions held near July levels.

KSE Institute comment

Market conditions did not improve in August, making the hryvnia's gain against the US dollar appear rather artificial. Most indicators pointed to underlying pressure that was elevated and, in places, rising: while the client-market deficit remained broadly flat close to its record, ER expectations deteriorated, household daily net demand rose by nearly 40%, and the cash-official spread widened. **The jump in household demand, however, reflects not only nervousness but also the liberalization effect.** Non-cash net purchases are seasonally concentrated in the first days of each month, when monthly limits reset, and part of wages is converted. But what was unusual in August is that the segment stayed in net purchase territory through the rest of the month as well, something that had last happened in January 2025. Moreover, the largest single-day spike came on 11 August, the day the new FX liberalization package took effect. Nor was this a shift between segments: per trading day, gross cash purchases rose by 6% alongside a 55% jump in gross non-cash purchases, so households bought more of both.

Part of the appreciation reflected global fluctuations, but the remainder looks bought. The US dollar weakened globally through August. Measured against a 50%/50% EUR+USD basket, the hryvnia lost about 0.8% over the month, which is broadly aligned with the deterioration of market conditions. The dollar leg, therefore, overstates the hryvnia's strength, while the intervention record suggests the latter was at least partly bought. At USD 4.8 billion, net sales were the third-largest monthly volume since the start of 2024. Volumes of that size are normally a symptom of heavy fundamental pressure (which is usually accompanied by ER depreciation), and/or of heavier intermediation of external financing through a large fiscal impulse: across the past 33 months, monthly interventions and Treasury-driven liquidity injections correlate at +0.6,

and the December 2024, December 2025, June 2026 and July 2026 peaks all coincided with injections well above average. August did not — the Treasury-driven liquidity injections were the weakest among months with comparable intervention volumes. The lagged-impulse hypothesis hardly accounts for heavier intermediation as well: in June–August, FX interventions absorbed UAH 81 billion more than the Treasury injected. NBU’s own guidance offers one explanation, namely, stepped-up sales to cover demand from importers of defense-industry components. Several features, however, seem out of place. The NBU sold more while the ER strengthened: weekly sales rose steadily through the month, from USD 1.02 billion in the week to 7 August to USD 1.27 billion in the week to 28 August, while the Hryvnia appreciated against the US dollar. The correlation between daily volumes and the level of the official ER flipped from +0.53 in July to -0.54 in August. Moreover, intervention spikes⁵ themselves were also rather unusual: shallow but frequent. On 6 of 21 trading days (28.6%) volumes ran more than 1.5 standard deviations above the trailing five-day average, the highest share since the start of 2024, yet the average deviation was only 2.2 standard deviations against 7.4 in February and 5.7 in April. And that came amid very calm USD/UAH dynamics (an average daily change of 0.1%). Selling that intensifies into a quiet, appreciating market hardly looks like smoothing excessive volatility. Thus, several readings remain open: a reduced tolerance for even mild depreciation, an unintentional or deliberate overestimation of the pickup in structural FX demand, or meeting demand through TOM deals settled outside the main session while still counting toward high headline volumes.

Leaning against depreciation is defensible at the current juncture, but it is a bet. From 27 August the ER moved below the lower bound of the crawl-like corridor in place since late 2025, ending the month around 1.1% below its central trend — the first break of the band since the start of the year. The pattern resembles 2024: after the hryvnia had weakened by 8% between January and July, the NBU held it in a near-horizontal band for four months, a 0.62 UAH range in total, before depreciation resumed in December. We read this as consistent with the NBU’s key policy rate decisions and its reaffirmed Monetary Policy Guidelines. The shift is broadly justified by a deteriorating balance of risks for inflation, an improved international reserve outlook, and the need to break the crawl-like pattern. It could also help create prerequisites to improve monetary transmission and revitalize the interbank market by draining the structural liquidity surplus on a material scale: the August interventions withdrew about UAH 217 billion, UAH 57 billion more than the government injected. The cost is reduced ER flexibility and a standing exposure — interventions of close to USD 5 billion per month are, in effect, a bet that external financing will arrive in full and broadly on schedule. Otherwise, the risk of an abrupt ER adjustment would rise.

We maintain our end-2026 forecast despite the partial shift in the modus operandi of the NBU’s FX policy. Amid rising inflation pressures, hryvnia depreciation will likely remain restrained in the near term, at the cost of an already-climbing intervention bill. Pressures persisted through the first two decades of September. The client-market gap averaged USD 184 million per day, the highest of 2026 so far (vs. USD 172 million in June), although it eased from USD 190 million in the first decade to USD 177 million in the second. Household net FX demand held at USD 44 million per day, the highest since March and some 60% above the August average. NBU sales stayed elevated as a result, averaging USD 1.25 billion per week over the three weeks to 18 September. Thus, holding the rate below the corridor is becoming more expensive, while higher energy imports, continued strikes on logistics and energy infrastructure, and the deterioration in ER expectations all point to further deterioration into the autumn. We therefore expect a gradual return to the crawl-like path towards UAH 46.0–46.5 per US dollar by December, especially in the absence of tangible progress in meeting the conditions for international financial assistance.

⁵ Spikes are identified with a z-score: the daily intervention volume minus the average of the preceding five trading days, divided by the sample standard deviation of that window. A day counts as a spike when the z-score exceeds 1.5. Because the official ER published on a given day reflects the previous day’s trading, intervention volumes are matched to the ER published on the following business day.

LABOR MARKET

In July 2026, the **average nominal wage** decreased by 1.6% m-o-m to **USD 721** (UAH 32,243) from **USD 733** (UAH 32,783) in June, but remained well above **USD 642** a year ago, according to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine (SSSU), with the **Work.ua estimate** unchanged at USD **671** (UAH 30,000). Annual growth, therefore, lost pace: nominal wages rose by 21.7% y-o-y after 25.4% in June. **Real wages** kept almost unchanged at **16.7% y-o-y**.

By mid-September, Work.ua data showed that **candidate salary expectations** slightly increased to **USD 758** (UAH 33,889) from **USD 750** in mid-August. In hryvnia terms, they are up 5.6% since mid-June, and the gap over the average wage actually paid in July widened to 5.1% from 2.2% a month earlier. The move coincided with a rebound in households' 12-month inflation expectations to 14.1% in August from 10.0% in July. The NBU also noted that elevated inflation expectations and rapid wage growth were supporting underlying price pressure. **Weekly active candidate CVs** reached **145,960** by mid-September against **136,351** a month earlier, on the other hand the **number of vacancies** fell to **66,275** from **69,530**, and the **ratio of active CVs** to vacancies increased to **2.20**. Both moves go well beyond the usual seasonal pattern. In 2024–2025, vacancies were broadly flat between mid-August and mid-September, whereas this year they fell by about 4 pp below the seasonal norm. In early September, vacancies were 5.5% lower y-o-y, the first annual decline this year after growth of 1–14% in January–August. CVs, which usually rise by only about 2% over these weeks, jumped by 7.0%. The non-seasonal shift coincides with strikes that destroyed warehouses and production facilities of major employers, forcing firms to cut hiring and, in some cases, staff.

According to the monthly enterprise survey run by the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting (IER), **the index of difficulty in finding qualified workers** increased again to **0.55** in July from **0.47** in June and **the index for unqualified workers** to **0.30** from **0.27**. Firms named mobilization (79.4%), limits on deferment from mobilization (57.8%) and emigration (52.3%) as the main causes.

The draft State Budget 2027, submitted to the Verkhovna Rada on September 15, assumes full-scale war throughout 2027 and rests on a macroeconomic forecast approved on June 4. It projects the average nominal wage at UAH 34,409 (+14.6%, or +5.3% in real terms) and the minimum wage at UAH 9,546 (+10.4%). The number of full-time employees is set to grow by 1.3% to 5.97 million, lifting the wage bill by 16%, while the unemployment rate is projected at 12.4% after 12.6% in 2026. On the spending side, the education subvention nearly doubles to UAH 193 billion to finance the 2026 teacher pay rises, a new war-risk insurance program of UAH 58.7 billion is introduced, and the Unemployment Insurance Fund's UAH 5 billion balance is redirected to pensions. The government's own stress test rates a further loss of 350–450 thousand workers as highly likely.

KSE Institute comment

Russian strikes on logistics and production have become a direct labor-market factor. By early August, over 400,000 sq m of warehouses had been destroyed since the start of July, and the Minister of Economy estimated this year's business losses at up to USD 10 billion. Large employers are cutting staff. Rozetka's largest warehouse, in Brovary, with over 1,000 employees, was destroyed on 5 August; the company is moving most of the staff to other sites but cutting some departments. Fozzy Group (Silpo, Fora, Thrash!) announced office and logistics job cuts from 1 November after more than 20 of its facilities were destroyed or damaged between 1 August and 25 September, while it keeps hiring for store and operational roles. The NBU's August business survey points the same way: only construction firms expect to add staff, and industry is the most pessimistic.

The draft budget 2027 slightly more pessimistic on the wage growth and optimistic on the job growth. As we argue in our analysis of the draft budget, the wage forecast looks too low. Against the UAH 31,284 we expect for 2026, UAH 34,409 implies only about 10% nominal growth and near-zero real growth. Yet several factors will push pay up: the higher minimum wage, the booking threshold of three minimum wages (rising to UAH 28,638), the carry-over of this year's teacher pay rises, and the 70% increase in base salaries for cultural

workers from January. Employment is the weaker assumption: +1.3% sits uneasily with the government's own stress test and with a forecast made before the summer strikes. Market-driven hiring will stay weak until damaged capacity is rebuilt, which makes the new war-risk insurance program one of the budget's most relevant tools for jobs.

INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT

Industrial production fell by **1.7% y-o-y** in July, the first year-on-year decline since February. **The mining industry** was essentially flat, with output little changed from its recent run rate (**0.3% y-o-y**). **Natural gas and crude oil extraction** continued to expand, albeit at a slightly slower pace (**+5.8% y-o-y**). At the same time, gas injections into underground storage continued ahead of the 2026–27 heating season, supported by domestic production and imports, while weaker domestic demand amid disruptions to energy-intensive industries created additional scope for storage accumulation. **Coal mining** remained deeply negative (**-10.4% y-o-y**), while **other mining and quarrying activities** came close to stabilizing (**-0.5% y-o-y**). By contrast, **metal ore extraction** deteriorated further, contracting by **14.4%**, amid continued weakness in metallurgical output due to high energy costs, logistics constraints, and subdued external demand. **Electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply** remained a major drag on the industrial production, contracting by **12.4% y-o-y**. The sector continued to operate under accumulated war-related damage and scheduled maintenance at nuclear generating units. Nevertheless, electricity supply conditions improved in July: lower demand, optimisation of the nuclear maintenance schedule, and additional system reserves helped Ukraine avoid prolonged electricity restrictions, although regional heatwaves reduced the availability of commercial electricity imports.

Manufacturing output was essentially flat in July (**-0.2% y-o-y**), marking a notable slowdown after several months of growth. Performance remained highly uneven across subsectors, with several previously resilient segments weakening. **Fabricated metal products** rose by **23.5% y-o-y**, while **other machinery and equipment** recorded particularly strong growth (**+62.1%**), with both categories likely benefiting in part from continued defense-related demand. **Beverage production** also returned to growth (**+8.7%**), the sector's first increase in a year after a prolonged run of declines.

At the same time, several major manufacturing segments weighed on overall output. **Basic metals output** contracted by **18.1% y-o-y** amid continued pressure from high energy costs, logistics constraints, and weak external demand. **Food manufacturing** declined by **1.7%**, while **pharmaceutical production** fell sharply by **27.7%**, continuing its prolonged downward trend, due to a combination of weaker demand, competition from imports, and security-related production disruptions.

KSE Institute comment

Industrial production turned negative in July, with growth increasingly concentrated in a narrow group of manufacturing segments. The widening gap between resilient machinery and fabricated metal production and weakening metallurgy highlights the growing divergence within industry. The outlook has deteriorated further as the shock has shifted from predominantly logistical constraints toward direct losses of production capacity following attacks on major steelmakers. This means that restoring maritime access alone would no longer be sufficient to quickly recover output. Industrial production is therefore likely to remain under pressure through the end of the year, with further attacks on industrial and energy infrastructure posing the main downside risk.

The shock to metallurgy is now shifting from logistics constraints toward direct losses of production capacity. Steel output fell by 57.3% y-o-y in August to 277 thousand tonnes, with the decline reflecting both

weaker export logistics and the first production disruptions caused by attacks on steel plants. Zaporizhstal was forced to suspend production after strikes in August, while Kametstal stopped operations following a ballistic missile strike on 5 September. ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih has also been unable to safely and sustainably restart operations following multiple missile strikes in August and September. The three plants together account for around 90% of Ukraine's steel production. With all three currently out of operation, September production is likely to be weaker still. This changes the nature of the shock: restoring maritime access could ease the logistics constraint, but it cannot quickly restore damaged steelmaking capacity. Iron ore producers are also becoming more dependent on export channels as domestic steelmaking capacity is taken offline, increasing their exposure to maritime logistics. The disruption will extend beyond steelmakers themselves, affecting upstream coke production, rail freight and tax revenues in major steel-producing cities.

Pharmaceutical production represents a separate source of industrial weakness that is less directly linked to the war-related logistics shock, although security risks are now adding a new supply-side constraint. Pharmaceutical output has declined y-o-y since November 2025, with July marking the deepest contraction so far at 27.7%. The decline has coincided with weaker physical sales of medicines, changes in the composition of demand and tighter pharmaceutical price regulation. Medicine sales fell by 9.6% y-o-y in packages in Q1, while the sector has also been operating under mandatory declaration of maximum wholesale prices in the National Price Catalogue. The security situation has introduced an additional risk. A strike on the Biocon pharmaceutical logistics complex on 3 September destroyed pharmaceutical stocks, potentially creating replacement demand, although it is unclear how much of this would translate into additional domestic production. A further strike damaged Darnytsia's production facilities on 23 September, with the company not disclosing the extent of the damage. The net effect on pharmaceutical output therefore remains uncertain.

The risk balance has consequently shifted from predominantly logistical disruption toward a combination of logistics, physical capacity, and security risks. The attacks on steelmakers and pharmaceutical facilities demonstrate that disruptions are no longer limited to export infrastructure. The main uncertainty is now the speed at which damaged production capacity can be restored, alongside the resilience of other large industrial facilities. Any further expansion of attacks to major manufacturing segments could deepen the contraction, while faster repairs and continued growth in machinery and other defense-related production could provide partial offsets.

OTHER OUTPUT

On September 9, the State Statistics Service revised Q2 2026 **real GDP growth** down to **0.4% y-o-y** from the 0.6% preliminary estimate, and to **0.3% q-o-q** seasonally adjusted from 0.4%, after incorporating updated Treasury data on budget execution, expanded balance-of-payments data, and new NBU and social-fund statistics; **nominal GDP** amounted to **UAH 2,305.7 billion**. Growth rested on domestic demand and exports: **household consumption** rose **6.9%** on real wage and pension gains, **gross fixed capital formation** **7.3%** on road, energy, and logistics repairs, and **exports of goods and services** **9.9%** on grain and metals shipped before the port closure, while **imports** slowed to **14.2%** and **government consumption** fell **1.5%** as external financing arrived late. By sector, **trade** (**+4.5%**), **finance** (**+27.8%**), **manufacturing** (**+2.5%**), and **gas extraction** (**+3.9%**) grew, while **construction** (**-10.6%**), **energy** (**-10.8%**), **transport** (**-6.4%**), and **agriculture** (**-3.5%**) contracted.

Agricultural production increased by **29.7% y-o-y** in July, driven primarily by crop production as the 2026 harvest campaign accelerated: 22.4 million tonnes of grain and legume crops was harvested during the month, up 31.1% y-o-y from 17.1 million tonnes in July 2025. By mid-July, harvesting of early grains and pulses had expanded across the country, with initial results indicating markedly higher yields than in 2025. Weather

conditions remained mixed across the country, following a cold and wet spring and amid heat and moisture shortages in some regions.

Freight volumes increased by **9.1% y-o-y**, while **freight turnover** rose by **9.2%**. The rebound comes off a deep base: freight turnover had fallen 20.4% in July 2025 and remained about 13% below its July 2024 level. Road transport recorded particularly strong growth, with **freight volumes** up by **32.7%** and **freight turnover** by **30.5% y-o-y**, as shippers shifted to land-based logistics amid disruptions at other transport routes. Rail freight remained broadly flat, with **volumes** increasing by just **0.8% y-o-y** and **turnover** by 2.6% y-o-y, supported by grain shipments, although Russian attacks on locomotives and rail infrastructure continued to constrain stronger growth.

Passenger transport performance remained relatively weak in aggregate, although rail demand was increasingly concentrated in longer-distance journeys. **The number of passengers** transported declined by **1.8% y-o-y**, while **passenger turnover** fell by **1.5%**. Rail remained the weak segment: **passenger numbers** declined by **16.7%**, but **passenger turnover** decreased by only **3.5%**, as the loss of short suburban trips (2.2 million passengers against 3.3 million a year earlier) outweighed a modest increase in long-distance travel. Road passenger transport was more resilient, with both **passenger numbers** and **passenger turnover** increasing by **0.7% y-o-y**.

Construction activity contracted sharply in July, with output falling by **25.9% y-o-y**. The decline was concentrated in **engineering structures (-36.0%)** and **non-residential construction (-15.9%)**, while **residential construction** remained broadly flat (**+0.5%**). The weakness came against a backdrop of rapidly rising construction prices and persistent supply-side and financial constraints: **construction prices** were **23.7%** higher y-o-y in July, while construction companies continued to cite labour shortages and financial constraints as the main factors limiting activity. Order books also remained relatively weak, although there were some signs of improvement. The seasonally adjusted balance of companies' assessments of their current **order volumes** stood at **-35.2%** in the third quarter, down from **-41.5%** in the second quarter, while the **construction confidence indicator** improved by 4 percentage points to **-21.1%**.

Retail trade continued to expand at a solid pace. Retail trade turnover increased by **8.7% y-o-y**, broadly in line with recent months. The continued expansion was supported by wage growth: **the average nominal wage** of a full-time employee was **21.7%** higher y-o-y in July, substantially exceeding **consumer price inflation** of **7.7%**. Retail business sentiment also remained positive, consistent with continued growth in consumer spending despite the broader wartime constraints on economic activity.

KSE Institute comment

July's headline growth rates say more about the 2025 base than about current momentum. The Q2 revision fits this reading: at 0.4% y-o-y, against the 0.6% we quoted in August, the economy carried less momentum into the second half than the preliminary estimate suggested, and the two components that held Q2 up, exports and public investment, are the ones the port closure and the Treasury squeeze have since removed. The largest moves reverse last year's swings: construction fell 25.9% after rising 45.1% in July 2025, agriculture grew 29.7% after falling 19.0%, and total freight turnover rose 9.2% after a 20.4% decline. Against July 2024, construction output is still about 7% higher, agriculture about 5% higher, and total freight turnover about 13% lower. Read on this two-year basis, July shows neither a construction collapse nor a transport recovery, but a real sector moving broadly sideways, with the port shock redirecting activity rather than adding to it.

A good harvest raises the stakes of the logistics shock instead of easing it. The calendar effect is already unwinding: cumulative agricultural output growth slowed to 5.9% y-o-y in January–August from 17.2% in January–July, which implies an outright y-o-y decline in August against a high base (+20.8% in August 2025). Over January–August, output was still about 3% below its 2024 level. Higher early yields mean more grain has to be moved or stored, while seaborne exports remain severely constrained and storage and port infrastructure remain exposed to strikes. Road freight growth of about a third shows that land routes are

absorbing as much as they can, but at higher unit costs and with limited room to scale further. Rail volumes have stayed flat despite grain support, as Russian strikes on locomotives and rail infrastructure intensify. The output index records the harvest when it is collected, not when it is sold, so strong summer prints can coexist with falling farm-gate prices, rising inventories, and thinner working capital, which will surface later in input purchases for the 2027 campaign. We expect agricultural growth to fade from August as the harvest calendar normalizes and the favorable base effect disappears.

The construction contraction is real in direction but overstated in size, and its composition points to public and defense-related investment as the weak link. Engineering structures, which combine budget- and donor-financed infrastructure with fortification works whose volume depends on the intensity of front-line changes, fell 36.0% y-o-y yet remain above their July 2024 level after last year's surge. With the general fund squeezed by delayed grants and rising defense needs, capital spending on infrastructure is likely to remain the first adjustment margin, keeping engineering works weak through year-end. Residential construction is flat for now but reported 60–70% declines in Kyiv housing transactions and developers' growing reliance on own funds suggest it will weaken with a lag as unsold stock accumulates. With construction prices up 23.7% y-o-y, fixed nominal budgets buy ever less physical work.

Retail growth has stepped down from the spring, and the balance of risks points to a further slowdown. On a two-year basis, growth eased to about 13–14% in July–August from 15–19% in March–June. The deceleration to 7.6% y-o-y in August partly reflects a firmer base (+6.3% in August 2025), with demand still supported by real wage gains of 16.7% in July (21.7% nominal growth deflated by 7.7% CPI) and precautionary buying, which is temporary. Both supports could weaken in the coming months: accelerating inflation will erode real incomes, while attacks on retail, warehouse, and logistics infrastructure constrain supply and prolonged air-raid alerts weigh on footfall. We expect retail growth to moderate further in the winter months.

REFORMS

In August, the Government continued to adapt economic and recovery policies to wartime conditions, with a focus on supporting agricultural exports, financing reconstruction, strengthening energy and infrastructure resilience, improving the framework for private investment, and further integrating Ukraine into European coordination mechanisms. While many decisions were technical in nature, several measures introduced important changes to the way recovery projects, strategic reserves, donor assistance, and public-private partnerships are managed.

One of the key economic decisions was the temporary reduction of minimum export prices for major agricultural commodities. For August 2026, the Government introduced a coefficient of 0.714 to the calculated minimum export prices for selected grains, oilseeds, vegetable oils, and processing products, effectively lowering the applicable minimum prices by more than 28%. The measure temporarily adjusts the existing export pricing mechanism to current market conditions and is particularly relevant for Ukraine's agricultural exporters.

Recovery financing remained a major priority. The Government approved a revised allocation of UAH 1.73 billion in state budget subventions to local budgets under the Emergency Credit Programme for Ukraine Recovery. The funding will support recovery projects in communities across 18 regions, with local co-financing requirements defined for individual projects. In parallel, more than UAH 5.1 billion from a Council of Europe Development Bank loan was directed to the HOME project to finance compensation for housing destroyed by the war. The funds will support the purchase or construction of replacement housing through Ukraine's housing certificate mechanism.

The Government also took steps to strengthen the role of private capital in Ukraine's recovery. New procedures were approved for assessing public-private partnership concepts and evaluating the effectiveness of PPP projects. The updated framework also requires public investment projects to be assessed for potential implementation through PPP or concession mechanisms. Technical solutions to integrate this assessment into the DREAM system are expected to be developed within six months. The changes are intended to make consideration of private-sector participation a more systematic part of public investment planning rather than a separate process.

Several decisions focused on strengthening energy and infrastructure resilience ahead of the colder months. The Government introduced separate winter and summer lists of critical facilities to be taken into account when electricity consumption limits are applied, requiring regional authorities to review critical infrastructure priorities according to seasonal needs. A two-year pilot project was also launched to allow underground storage of petroleum products held as part of Ukraine's minimum strategic reserves. The initiative is designed to improve the physical protection and resilience of fuel stocks during wartime by using underground storage facilities and other protected infrastructure.

Security and emergency response capacity also remained an important area of government policy. UAH 70 million from the state budget reserve fund was allocated to strengthen anti-drone protection along 37 kilometres of routes in Sumy region. The Government also approved procedures governing Ukraine's participation in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, establishing the State Emergency Service as the national coordinator and formalizing cooperation with the EU's Emergency Response Coordination Centre. The framework regulates the exchange of information and the provision and receipt of assistance during emergencies, further integrating Ukraine into European civil protection arrangements.

Digital tools continued to be introduced to improve coordination and transparency in public administration. A two-year pilot project will establish the Donor Platform, a state digital system for recording, monitoring, and coordinating international assistance for humanitarian mine action. The platform is expected to consolidate information on donor contributions, funding requests, and projects and improve monitoring of their alignment with Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy through 2033. The Government also launched a two-year pilot allowing couples to complete the entire marriage registration process electronically through Diia, including application, identity verification, registration by video conference, and electronic signing of the civil status record.

The Government also made targeted adjustments to support mechanisms for people affected by the war. Procedures for granting combatant status were updated to ensure that the automatic process also applies to foreign nationals and stateless persons, while documentation requirements for obtaining combatant or war-related disability status were clarified.

KSE Institute comment

Overall, August's decisions reflected a continued shift from emergency responses toward more structured mechanisms for recovery and resilience. Alongside short-term adjustments responding to wartime economic and security conditions, the Government continued to develop frameworks for mobilizing private investment, coordinating international assistance, protecting strategic infrastructure, and integrating Ukraine more closely into European institutional mechanisms.

August reinforced a familiar imbalance in Ukraine's recovery architecture: financing and new institutional frameworks are accumulating faster than implementation capacity. The Government directed UAH 5.1 billion to destroyed-housing compensation and UAH 1.73 billion to local recovery projects, while simultaneously expanding the institutional framework for public-private partnerships. Requiring public investment projects to be screened for potential delivery through PPPs or concessions is a meaningful improvement: private-sector participation is now considered earlier in the project cycle rather than after the financing structure has largely been determined. But screening alone will not mobilize private capital. The next constraint is project

preparation - turning identified needs into projects with credible economics, risk allocation and implementation structures that investors can actually finance.

This matters because the external financing environment is becoming increasingly conditional on the quality of implementation. The [IMF's July review](#) found that structural reform implementation had slowed and specifically identified stronger public investment management and a better investment climate among the priorities for recovery and long-term growth. August's decisions on PPPs, DREAM, donor coordination and recovery financing therefore move in the right direction, but they also raise the cost of weak execution: Ukraine increasingly has the frameworks to identify, finance and coordinate recovery projects, while the bottleneck is shifting toward the capacity to prepare and deliver them. The test for the coming months is whether the growing recovery architecture produces a stronger pipeline of implementable and financeable projects rather than another layer of procedures.

FOCUS AREAS AND RISKS

The main risks for Q4 are the preparations for a heating season and air defense. Russia has shifted to jet-powered Shaheds flying at 400–600 km/h. In September it launched more than 2,700 of them, only about 55% were neutralized, and Kyiv came under repeated combined attacks that disrupt the business activity, logistics and routine living activities. Patriot interceptors, the only effective defense against ballistic missiles, have arrived at about a third of last year's pace, and the shortfall is already costing production capacity. Missile strikes, mostly ballistic, have idled Zaporizhstal, Kametstal, and ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih, plants that produce about 90% of Ukraine's steel (see [Industrial Output](#) and [External Sector](#)). The energy system is the next critical target for Russian attacks. According to the Minister of Energy, Russian plans for winter strikes cover generation, heating, water, and interconnectors with the EU. In mid-August, backup power at heat and water facilities covered **only 920 of the 1,215 MW** needed.

Conditionality is the second risk. On September 24, the EU Council approved nearly EUR 3 billion (USD 3.4 billion) under the Ukraine Facility, with 84 of the 95 steps due so far completed. The EUR 3.7 billion (USD 4.2 billion) MFA instalment and the next IMF tranche, however, still hinge on the parcel-tax bill, which has passed only its first reading. About USD 15 billion of partner support depends on 44 Cabinet decisions due by November 1. The IMF's second review, expected in November, requires financing assurances for a 2027 external need of USD 52.6 billion. Hungary again blocked accession clusters 2 and 3 on September 1 and 8, and the US-led talks of September 5–6 made no progress on territory.

KSE Institute comment

Air defense has become a macroeconomic variable. Cheap jet drones (although they're a high-cost version of previously used in massive numbers Shahed-238) against scarce, expensive interceptors means more strikes get through. Each successful strike on energy or industry converts into extra imports of gas, electricity, and metal products and into lost exports, so the air defense gap feeds directly into the FX deficit the NBU is financing. It also converts to operating in survival-mode even for businesses far enough from the frontline, as logistics and warehouses are under constant attacks. Metallurgy shows why this damage is especially hard to reverse.

The strike calendar and the conditionality calendar peak together. The heating season, the November 1 deadline, and the IMF review all fall within the same six weeks. If legislative items slip, the financing shortfall will coincide with peak energy import needs, and the adjustment will fall on non-defense spending and reserves. The priority is therefore to pass the parcel tax in second reading and the delayed Tax Code amendments before the IMF mission, since together they unlock both IMF and EU money.

TABLES: EXTERNAL INDICATORS

Current account, USD billion								Update: 31.08.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	-3.0	-0.3	-1.5	-1.8	-3.6	-3.4	-0.4	-2.6	-3.4	-2.1	-3.4	-1.4
2026	-0.8	-4.8	-4.1	-4.3	-3.7	6.3	-0.1					
Goods balance, USD billion								Update: 31.08.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	-3.0	-3.2	-4.0	-3.6	-3.6	-4.5	-4.6	-4.1	-5.0	-4.5	-4.7	-6.5
2026	-4.0	-5.6	-5.9	-5.0	-4.9	-5.6	-6.0					
Goods exports, USD billion								Update: 31.08.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	3.0	2.9	3.5	3.2	3.4	2.9	3.1	2.9	3.0	3.5	3.4	3.4
2026	3.1	3.0	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.2	2.9					
Goods imports, USD billion								Update: 31.08.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	6.0	6.1	7.5	6.8	7.1	7.4	7.7	7.0	8.0	8.1	8.1	9.9
2026	7.1	8.7	9.4	8.6	8.3	8.8	8.8					
Services balance, USD billion								Update: 31.08.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	-0.8	-0.4	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.8	-0.6	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7	-0.6
2026	-0.8	-0.7	-0.8	-0.6	-0.6	-0.7	-0.7					
Primary income balance, USD billion								Update: 31.08.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	-0.2	-0.2	0.0	0.1	0.0	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.1	0.1	0.0	-0.2
2026	-0.2	-0.2	0.0	0.0	-0.3	-0.2	-0.1					
Secondary income balance, USD billion								Update: 31.08.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	1.0	0.8	3.0	2.4	0.6	2.0	1.2	2.4	2.3	3.1	2.1	0.6
2026	4.1	1.7	2.6	1.3	2.1	12.8	6.7					
Non-res. capital flows, USD billion								Update: 31.08.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	0.8	-0.3	5.0	6.2	1.7	3.7	1.8	5.1	3.1	5.4	7.7	7.3
2026	0.6	1.5	0.8	1.6	0.5	4.5	0.6					
Loans to public sector, USD billion								Update: 31.08.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	3.1	-0.1	3.8	5.4	1.1	0.0	1.8	4.6	1.5	4.9	7.0	6.7
2026	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.9	-0.1	4.2	0.5					
Resident capital flows, USD billion								Update: 31.08.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	2.7	-0.2	1.5	1.0	0.6	-0.2	0.2	0.0	-0.4	0.8	-0.3	0.3
2026	0.9	-0.4	0.3	1.2	-0.7	4.6	1.4					
Reserves (eop), USD billion								Update: 31.08.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	43.0	40.1	42.4	46.7	44.5	45.1	43.0	46.0	46.6	49.5	54.8	57.3
2026	57.7	54.8	52.0	48.2	45.7	51.3	51.2					

Source: NBU, KSE Institute

TABLES: FISCAL INDICATORS

Budget revenues (General Fund), UAH billion												
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	128	133	321	275	205	241	163	243	208	186	229	330
2026	242	225	268	303	319	542	166					
Budget revenues (State Budget), UAH billion												
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	283	253	390	340	275	327	227	315	302	261	322	539
2026	304	321	394	410	417	681	722					
Tax Revenues (General Fund), UAH billion												
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	132	136	225	146	186	144	159	201	159	153	197	178
2026	144	167	258	178	225	185	154					
Budget expenditures (General Fund), UAH billion												
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	214	324	318	330	353	337	296	334	313	347	380	650
2026	244	303	369	433	449	432	346					
Budget expenditures (State Budget), UAH billion												
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	354	413	397	391	431	432	360	460	401	440	462	933
2026	286	372	492	555	551	575	606					
Expenditures, defense & security (General Fund), UAH billion												
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	135	211	228	208	223	192	190	219	215	225	226	454
2026	154	182	249	288	292	269	222					
Budget balance (General Fund), UAH billion												
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	-86	-191	3	-55	-148	-96	-132	-91	-104	-161	-151	-321
2026	-2	-78	-101	-130	-130	110	-185					
Domestic Financing, UAH billion												
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	27	26	47	54	43	36	70	43	37	91	39	69
2026	61	64	25	26	16	38	69					
External Financing, UAH billion												
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	131	0	134	185	47	127	71	195	48	211	293	278
2026	0	0	66	2	0.3	187	53					

Source: Ministry of Finance, KSE Institute

TABLES: INFLATION INDICATORS (1/2)

Headline CPI, y-o-y, %												Update: 22.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	12.9	13.4	14.6	15.1	15.9	14.3	14.1	13.2	11.9	10.9	9.3	8.0
2026	7.4	7.6	7.9	8.6	8.2	7.2	7.7	8.1				
Headline CPI, m-o-m, %												Update: 22.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	1.2	0.8	1.5	0.7	1.3	0.8	-0.2	-0.2	0.3	0.9	0.4	0.2
2026	0.7	1.0	1.7	1.4	0.9	-0.1	0.3	0.1				
Core CPI, y-o-y, %												Update: 10.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	11.7	12.0	12.4	12.1	12.3	12.1	11.7	11.4	11.0	10.1	9.3	8.0
2026	7.0	7.0	7.1	7.6	7.9	8.1	8.1	8.1				
Raw-food CPI, y-o-y, %												Update: 10.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	11.8	13.0	17.0	22.2	26.4	28.7	28.0	23.9	18.1	15.2	9.6	7.4
2026	8.2	9.6	8.4	8.3	4.6	-0.2	2.2	1.0				
Administered-price CPI, y-o-y, %												Update: 10.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	17.5	18.1	19	19.5	19.8	10.9	11.0	10.8	10.7	10.6	10.4	9.7
2026	9.1	8.8	8.6	9.4	10.2	10.7	11.8	13.0				
Fuel CPI, y-o-y, %												Update: 10.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	12.1	13.9	9.9	3.7	1.2	3.1	6.7	6.0	4.7	3.9	5.3	6.4
2026	5.7	8.0	23.4	36.1	38.7	33.4	28.0	38.7				
Processed-food CPI, y-o-y, %												Update: 10.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	15.9	16.7	17.3	17.3	18.0	18.2	18.0	17.7	16.8	15.6	14.0	12.1
2026	10.8	9.9	10.0	10.2	10.4	10.4	10.0	10.0				
Non-food CPI, y-o-y, %												Update: 10.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	4.3	4.4	4.7	3.8	3.8	3.6	3.2	2.8	2.3	1.6	0.8	0.0
2026	-0.4	-0.4	-0.5	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.8	1.1				
Services CPI, y-o-y, %												Update: 10.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	14.2	14.3	14.6	14.6	14.6	14.4	14.0	14.1	14.1	13.8	13.4	12.3
2026	11.2	12.3	12.8	13.3	13.6	13.7	13.7	13.4				
Industrial PPI, y-o-y, %												Update: 22.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	32.5	37.0	51.9	41.6	28.9	13.1	4.7	7.3	1.3	5.5	9.9	8.2
2026	11.2	34.5	36.6	40.2	45.2	39.1	42.5	37.3				

Source: NBU, SSSU, KSE Institute

TABLES: INFLATION INDICATORS (2/2)

Households' year-ahead inflation expectations, %												Update: 14.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	11.0	9.9	9.2	10.1	10.2	10.8	10.7	10.1	10.8	10.3	10.4	10.5
2026	10.9	13.5	14.4	10.9	13.7	12.7	10.0	14.1				
Analysts' year-ahead inflation expectations, %												Update: 14.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	7.8	7.8		7.7	7.9		7.5		7.2	7.4		7.5
2026	7.5		7.7	7.6		7.5	7.9		8.3			
Water supply prices, y-o-y, %												Update: 22.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
2026	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	15.3	52.1	77.6				
Food and non-alcoholic beverage prices, y-o-y, %												Update: 22.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	14.3	15.2	17.4	19.8	22.1	23.2	22.6	20.5	17.4	15.6	12.1	10.2
2026	9.7	9.9	9.5	9.6	7.9	5.6	6.5	6.0				
Egg prices, y-o-y, %												Update: 22.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	-5.1	1.8	44.7	74.6	86.0	59.2	82.4	74.3	50.9	41.9	3.3	10.8
2026	33.0	32.4	20.1	19.0	10.4	-19.4	-25.4	-24.1				
Vegetable prices, y-o-y, %												Update: 22.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	33.9	29.4	32.3	35.8	35.7	24.2	17.5	-2.5	-16.0	-21.5	-27.8	-29.8
2026	-23.7	-14.6	-15.1	-14.3	-16.8	-12.8	7.8	0.9				
Meat prices, y-o-y, %												Update: 22.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	5.3	6.8	8.5	12.6	18.2	22.9	24.2	25.2	24.8	25.2	23.1	21.0
2026	18.5	16.4	15.3	13.2	7.9	4.4	2.4	1.3				
Milk prices, y-o-y, %												Update: 22.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	18.1	18.3	19.5	19.9	20.9	20.9	20.3	20.0	17.1	17.7	12.3	8.5
2026	8.3	7.7	7.3	8.0	7.4	7.6	8.0	6.9				
Tobacco prices, y-o-y, %												Update: 22.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	24.3	25.1	26.4	27.6	28.3	28.4	30.1	30.9	29.3	28.8	28.7	27.7
2026	26.8	26.3	25.0	24.5	24.6	24.6	23.6	23.7				
Alcoholic beverage prices, y-o-y, %												Update: 22.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	3.8	4.3	6.1	6.2	6.9	6.6	6.7	5.6	6.6	6.4	6.1	4.7
2026	4.4	4.6	4.2	4.5	5.5	6.1	6.5	7.9				

Source: NBU, SSSU, KSE Institute

TABLES: MONETARY POLICY INDICATORS

Key policy rate, % (eop)												Update: 18.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	14.5	14.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5
2026	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.5	15.5				
Effective policy rate, % (avg)												Update: 18.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	14.0	14.7	15.5	15.8	15.9	16.1	16.2	16.3	16.3	16.3	16.4	16.3
2026	16.2	16.0	16.2	16.2	16.0	16.0	16.1	16.4				
Structural liquidity surplus (+)/deficit (-), UAH billion (avg)												Update: 18.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	496.5	496.8	499.5	539.1	545.8	534.5	494.6	453.5	451.1	499.1	517.1	594.4
2026	707.0	656.1	586.7	591.8	651.4	658.7	638.5	623.1				
Correspondent accounts, UAH billion (avg)												Update: 18.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	258.3	240.7	243.9	239.1	252.4	253.5	251.9	257.3	244.4	244.5	260.9	258.0
2026	260.8	290.0	264.5	269.0	275.7	290.0	287.1	284.6				
NBU certificates of deposit, UAH billion (avg)												Update: 18.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	481.7	509.1	502.9	553.2	546.5	537.6	498.9	454.6	469.0	518.2	522.6	613.4
2026	718.8	645.5	599.4	607.8	661.9	656.4	641.0	627.0				
Overnight certificates of deposit, UAH billion (avg)												Update: 18.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	430.4	458.4	435.8	475.7	464.6	450.3	397.6	348.6	356.3	401.8	395.5	481.9
2026	580.6	474.5	407.9	409.8	468.6	461.2	442.7	445.3				
3-month certificates of deposit, UAH billion (avg)												Update: 18.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	51.2	50.7	67.0	77.4	81.9	87.3	101.3	105.9	112.7	116.4	127.1	131.5
2026	136.8	171.1	191.6	197.9	193.3	195.2	198.3	181.7				
Share of 3-month certificates of deposit, % (avg)												Update: 18.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	10.6	10.0	13.3	14.0	15.0	16.2	20.3	23.3	24.0	22.5	24.3	21.4
2026	19.0	26.5	32.0	32.6	29.2	29.7	30.9	29.0				
Refinancing loans outstanding, UAH billion (avg)												Update: 18.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	32.2	32.1	32.1	31.8	31.5	31.6	31.4	31.4	31.4	31.2	31.0	30.9
2026	29.0	28.9	28.8	28.7	28.3	28.2	28.2	28.2				
Net treasury operations, UAH billion												Update: 18.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	76.2	188.0	68.5	167.2	110.6	122.2	84.3	95.5	131.9	160.9	147.4	422.8
2026	61.2	110.2	116.1	241.4	198.1	216.8	202.0	159.5				

Source: NBU, KSE Institute

TABLES: BANKING INDICATORS (1/3)

Regulatory capital adequacy, %												Update: 16.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	17.0	16.9	16.2	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.3	15.0	15.4	15.3	15.1	16.4
2026	16.0	15.8	15.8	17.6	17.7	17.6	17.2	17.0				
Net stable funding ratio, % (median, eop)												Update: 16.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	187	182	183	192	190	185	185	179	173	174	178	185
2026	185	177	176	181	186	185	193	179				
ROE, %												Update: 23.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	51.1	42.8	39.8	40.1	39.9	40.2	39.9	39.6	39.1	38.3	38.2	29.9
2026	26.0	22.5	21.8	21.7	22.5	22.5	22.1	22.1				
ROA, %												Update: 23.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	5.8	4.9	4.6	4.7	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.6	3.6
2026	3.1	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7				
NPL ratio, eop, %												Update: 20.08.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	30.5	30.0	28.6	28.3	27.9	27.0	26.1	25.4	25.0	24.5	23.9	13.9
2026	13.9	13.3	12.9	12.6	12.8	12.5	12.1					
Total gross loans to residents, UAH billion (eop)												Update: 16.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	1105	1122	1145	1165	1187	1211	1235	1265	1282	1314	1349	1198
2026	1213	1233	1264	1293	1316	1347	1388	1440				
UAH gross corporate loans, UAH billion (eop)												Update: 16.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	570	585	602	610	627	641	656	673	678	690	707	555
2026	560	572	587	609	615	641	666	691				
UAH gross retail loans, UAH billion (eop)												Update: 16.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	269	272	279	284	291	298	307	316	320	325	335	332
2026	341	346	359	364	377	386	399	414				
Total net loans, UAH billion (eop)												Update: 16.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	822	838	867	887	908	933	956	985	1006	1036	1070	1080
2026	1094	1113	1144	1171	1192	1221	1261	1316				
UAH net loans, UAH billion (eop)												Update: 16.09.26
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	615	632	657	670	694	716	738	764	775	791	818	818
2026	830	846	874	900	918	953	991	1033				

Source: NBU, KSE Institute

TABLES: BANKING INDICATORS (2/3)

Total net corporate loans, UAH billion (eop)											Update: 16.09.26	
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	583	597	619	634	649	668	683	704	720	745	771	774
2026	781	796	815	838	848	868	894	933				
UAH net corporate loans, UAH billion (eop)											Update: 16.09.26	
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	385	400	418	426	443	459	473	490	495	507	524	517
2026	522	534	550	571	576	602	626	652				
Total net retail loans, UAH billion (eop)											Update: 16.09.26	
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	227	229	237	242	249	255	263	271	277	282	290	297
2026	305	309	321	326	338	347	358	375				
UAH net retail loans, UAH billion (eop)											Update: 16.09.26	
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	226	228	236	241	248	254	262	270	276	281	289	296
2026	304	308	321	325	338	346	358	374				
Total resident deposits, UAH billion (eop)											Update: 16.09.26	
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	2724	2734	2757	2815	2806	2851	2849	2851	2893	2955	2984	3239
2026	3172	3180	3165	3248	3249	3283	3313	3317				
Total corporate deposits, UAH billion (eop)											Update: 16.09.26	
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	1458	1452	1481	1500	1481	1492	1485	1484	1503	1544	1556	1755
2026	1685	1649	1643	1682	1705	1704	1729	1727				
UAH corporate deposits, UAH billion (eop)											Update: 16.09.26	
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	1029	1050	1079	1091	1077	1083	1066	1059	1078	1108	1142	1328
2026	1255	1217	1217	1239	1263	1268	1300	1298				
Total retail deposits, UAH billion (eop)											Update: 16.09.26	
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	1213	1227	1222	1257	1265	1296	1300	1302	1322	1341	1355	1399
2026	1408	1449	1439	1478	1478	1519	1519	1527				
UAH retail deposits, UAH billion (eop)											Update: 16.09.26	
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	793	809	798	823	834	856	855	867	885	897	905	940
2026	940	969	955	986	988	1022	1019	1018				
Share of term deposits in total retail UAH deposits, %											Update: 20.08.26	
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	33.9	33.5	34.3	34.0	34.1	34.0	34.4	34.2	33.9	34.1	34.3	33.8
2026	34.5	34.0	34.8	34.1	34.4	33.9	34.3					

Source: NBU, KSE Institute

TABLES: BANKING INDICATORS (3/3)

Retail deposits dollarization, % (eop)										Update: 16.09.26		
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	34.6	34.1	34.7	34.5	34.1	34.0	34.2	33.4	33.0	33.1	33.2	32.8
2026	33.3	33.1	33.6	33.3	33.2	32.7	33.0	33.3				
Corporate deposits dollarization, % (eop)										Update: 16.09.26		
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	29.4	27.7	27.2	27.3	27.3	27.4	28.2	28.6	28.3	28.3	26.6	24.3
2026	25.5	26.2	26.0	26.3	25.9	25.6	24.9	24.9				
Total G-bonds holdings, UAH billion (avg)										Update: 16.09.26		
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	1862	1861	1831	1831	1832	1840	1858	1871	1878	1882	1899	1923
2026	1986	1996	2014	2015	1996	1988	1992	2006				
UAH G-bonds holdings (firms), UAH billion (avg)										Update: 16.09.26		
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	145	148	147	150	151	150	148	150	146	141	144	156
2026	192	196	200	201	200	197	195	198				
UAH G-bonds holdings (households), UAH billion (avg)										Update: 16.09.26		
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	39	41	42	47	48	50	52	55	56	57	60	64
2026	68	74	81	85	89	92	96	100				
Interest rate on new UAH corporate loans, % (avg)										Update: 16.09.26		
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	16.6	15.4	15.6	16.8	15.4	15.5	16.9	15.1	15.0	16.2	15.2	15.1
2026	16.5	15.1	14.8	15.8	15.1	15.0	15.9	15.4				
Interest rate on new FX corporate loans, % (avg)										Update: 16.09.26		
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	6.3	6.2	6.3	6.3	6.2	5.8	5.9	5.9	6.0	5.9	5.5	6.7
2026	5.9	5.7	5.9	6.1	5.8	6.0	5.8	5.8				
Interest rate on new UAH retail loans, % (avg)										Update: 16.09.26		
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	35.1	35.0	35.9	35.7	35.8	35.9	36.2	36.2	35.9	35.9	35.0	35.2
2026	37.0	36.5	36.6	37.0	36.7	36.7	36.6	35.1				
Interest rates on UAH corporate deposits, % (avg)										Update: 16.09.26		
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	8.7	9.1	9.4	9.7	9.9	10.1	10.2	10.2	10.3	10.4	10.3	10.3
2026	10.2	10.0	9.8	9.9	10.0	10.1	10.3	10.4				
Interest rates on UAH retail term deposits, % (avg)										Update: 16.09.26		
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	12.4	12.5	12.4	12.8	12.9	13.0	12.9	12.9	12.7	12.6	12.7	12.9
2026	12.8	12.5	12.2	12.8	12.8	12.9	12.9					

Source: NBU, KSE Institute

TABLES: EXCHANGE RATE INDICATORS

USD/UAH official (avg)								Update: 16.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	42.1	41.7	41.5	41.4	41.5	41.6	41.8	41.4	41.3	41.6	42.1	42.2
2026	42.9	43.1	43.8	43.8	44.1	44.7	44.7	44.7				
EUR/UAH official (avg)								Update: 16.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	43.6	43.4	44.8	46.4	46.9	47.8	48.9	48.2	48.4	48.5	48.7	49.4
2026	50.4	51.0	50.7	51.1	51.5	51.5	51.0	51.8				
USD/UAH spread (official/cash(ask)), % (avg)								Update: 16.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	1.1	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6
2026	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6				
Households' net FX demand, USD million (avg)								Update: 16.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	1480	958	720	190	248	282	270	351	356	736	737	724
2026	821	541	1019	349	231	482	447	562				
Households' net FX demand, USD million (daily avg)								Update: 16.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	64	48	34	9	11	13	12	16	16	32	35	33
2026	36	26	46	16	10	22	19	27				
Bank clients' net demand for FX, USD million (avg)								Update: 16.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	1832	1711	1360	1563	1958	2021	2332	1541	1261	1453	1423	3010
2026	2268	1864	2968	2563	2207	3778	3492	3520				
Bank clients' net demand for FX, USD million (daily avg)								Update: 16.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	80	86	65	71	85	96	101	73	57	63	68	131
2026	99	89	135	116	100	172	152	168				
NBU net FX interventions, USD billion								Update: 16.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	-3.7	-3.1	-2.6	-2.2	-2.9	-3.0	-3.4	-2.7	-2.3	-2.9	-2.9	-4.5
2026	-3.7	-3.0	-4.8	-3.6	-3.2	-5.1	-4.8	-4.8				
Share of interbank FX turnover without the NBU, %								Update: 16.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	38	48	54	58	52	53	52	55	65	58	55	49
2026	48	51	42	51	55	41	43	40				

Source: NBU, KSE Institute

TABLES: LABOR INDICATORS

Average nominal wage, USD								Update: 17.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	555	559	597	606	606	632	642	623	632	638	645	733
2026	652	657	693	697	702	733	721					
Real wage growth, % y-o-y								Update: 17.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	12.6	9.9	10.9	6.4	5.7	7.0	7.3	7.9	5.3	8.3	8.9	5.7
2026	14.3	14.8	14.7	12.7	14.4	16.5	16.7					
Nominal wage Work.ua, USD								Update: 17.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	543	568	578	590	600	604	605	601	606	623	641	
2026	641	645	651	662	680	671	671	671				
Qualified workers shortage, index								Update: 17.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	0.50	0.46	0.48	0.46	0.48	0.50	0.45	0.48	0.53	0.47	0.51	0.57
2026	0.53	0.53	0.61	0.65	0.62	0.47	0.55					
Unqualified workers shortage, index								Update: 17.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	0.29	0.29	0.35	0.33	0.34	0.31	0.35	0.33	0.37	0.30	0.31	0.31
2026	0.29	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.36	0.27	0.30					

Source: SSSU, Work.ua, IER, KSE Institute

TABLES: OUTPUT INDICATORS (1/2)

Agricultural prod. Index, %, y-o-y								Update: 22.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	-5.7	-2.7	-4.0	-7.8	-6.7	-35.5	-19	20.8	-23.7	-1.1	84.7	-18.9
2026	3.2	0.1	0.4	2.9	0.5	-8.4	29.7					
Industry prod. Index, %, y-o-y								Update: 22.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	-2.7	-8.2	-5.1	-5.4	0.1	4.3	4.5	1.9	1.8	-3.0	-4.9	-2.1
2026	-8.1	-2.6	4.5	1.2	0.3	1.1	-1.7					
Mining prod. Index, %, y-o-y								Update: 22.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	-0.7	-24.4	-19.7	-17.3	-7.7	-5.4	-1.6	-3.9	0.5	-19.4	-14.5	-10.1
2026	-9.7	9.0	10.8	8.9	2.8	1.3	0.3					
Manufacturing production Index, %, y-o-y								Update: 22.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	-1.1	-3.9	2.2	-3.1	3.2	7.5	5.7	3.7	1.3	2.1	1.5	4.6
2026	-6.0	-1.2	6.2	1.1	1.8	3.3	-0.2					
Energy production Index, %, y-o-y								Update: 22.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	-10.8	2.3	-8.7	7.8	0.5	9.9	11.8	6.0	7.5	2.9	-17.5	-16.1
2026	-12.7	-21.2	-11.8	-10.7	-11.5	-10.1	-12.4					
Construction production Index, %, y-o-y								Update: 22.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	13.4	9.8	-22.3	-15.4	9.1	48.6	45.1	23.2	22.4	-7.8	6.9	15.9
2026	3.3	-8.4	-9.4	2.8	-17.8	-13.9	-25.9					
Buildings, %, y-o-y								Update: 22.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	22.3	15.7	16.2	7.0	29.7	37.3	23.8	28.6	31.3	10.2	22.1	20.7
2026	-6.5	-17.3	-14.3	-3.5	-14.5	1.4	-11.3					
Residential buildings, %, y-o-y								Update: 22.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	0.0	-4.9	5.0	-14	14.9	36	2.8	30.5	24.5	10.9	28.4	25.6
2026	-12	-15.9	-16.2	5.8	-5.9	0.2	0.5					
Non-residential buildings, %, y-o-y								Update: 22.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	36.7	28.1	21.9	19.2	36.9	37.9	34.6	27.8	34.2	9.9	19.9	19.3
2026	-4.0	-18.0	-13.4	-7.4	-18.1	1.9	-15.9					
Engineering structures, %, y-o-y								Update: 22.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	4.0	3.3	-43.8	-31.1	-3.6	57.2	64.8	18.9	15.2	-19.9	-5.1	11.5
2026	15.5	2.7	-3.7	9.7	-20.4	-24.1	-36					

Source: SSSU, KSE Institute

TABLES: OUTPUT INDICATORS (2/2)

Cargo transported, %, y-o-y								Update: 22.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	-9.3	-12.3	-24.1	-22.7	-4.6	3.5	-5.7	-1.8	-4.8	-12	-7.4	-4.8
2026	-5.3	-7.3	12.6	22	1.4	0.7	9.1					
Freight turnover, %, y-o-y								Update: 22.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	-7.0	-11.3	-23.7	-27.1	-4.8	4.7	-20.4	-14.8	-11.8	-18.1	-14.9	-18.1
2026	-18.4	-19.6	0.9	10.5	-16.3	-16.4	9.2					
Passengers carried, %, y-o-y								Update: 22.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	3.7	-6.1	0.3	0.2	-0.2	2.9	2.0	0.2	3.0	-1.7	0.5	-1.4
2026	-8.3	-15.3	-3.1	-2.4	-0.4	-1.1	-1.8					
Passenger turnover, %, y-o-y								Update: 22.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	5.4	3.5	4.8	6.9	3.0	9.7	5.0	6.7	6.0	1.8	-0.6	-2.0
2026	19.8	-39.4	-7.2	-4.6	-3.0	-4.3	-1.5					
Retail trade turnover, %, y-o-y								Update: 22.09.26				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
2025	5.9	4.0	5.3	6.6	7.0	7.3	3.9	6.3	7.1	10.1	14.1	16.5
2026	13.4	7.5	12.8	7.8	10.9	8.4	8.7					

Source: SSSU, KSE Institute