

# STATE DEBT REVIEW 2025

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	2
GENERAL INFORMATION	2
BUDGET FINANCING	5
EXTERNAL DEBT	6
DOMESTIC DEBT	8
DEBT MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS	9
DEBT SERVICE	10
STATE GUARANTEED DEBT	10
COUNTRY CREDIT RATING	11
DEBT ACCUMULATION OUTLOOK	11
STRATEGIC AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK	12

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**State and state-guaranteed debt reached 101% of GDP in 2025.** Total state and state-guaranteed debt rose by 28.4% (\$47.2 bn) to \$213.3 bn, driven almost entirely by external borrowings (\$45.5 bn, 39.6% growth); domestic debt grew at a more moderate 4.7%.

**Non-debt-creating financial support is critically important for Ukraine's economy.** In 2025, Ukraine received \$13.1 bn in grants. Servicing and repayment of ERA loans, which currently account for 17.8% of total debt, will be covered by non-budgetary sources, namely revenues from frozen Russian assets, effectively imposing no additional debt burden on Ukraine.

**External support continued to shift toward concessional financing, while its role continued to grow.** The share of FX-denominated debt rose to 79%, with the euro overtaking the dollar (45% vs 23%) as the EU consolidated its position as Ukraine's primary creditor.

**The debt portfolio improved on every key risk metric.** Average time to maturity rose from 11.4 to 13.4 years, the weighted cost of debt fell from 5.1% to 4.6%. The successful restructuring of GDP warrants replaced a high-fiscal-risk instrument with predictable obligations and is estimated to save \$6–20 bn over 2025–2041, supporting two consecutive sovereign rating upgrades (Fitch CCC, S&P CCC+).

**Active debt management became the cornerstone strategy in 2025.** Key milestones included the first domestic switch auctions (\$0.8 bn), the GDP warrants restructuring, and approval of the Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy 2026–2028 (December 2025). The Public Financial Management Reform Strategy 2026–2030 (February 2026) provides for a dedicated Debt Agency to be operational by 2027.


**Public debt is set to keep rising in the medium term.** The government targets debt-to-GDP at or below 100% according to the Budget Declaration 2026–2029, but the Law on the State Budget 2026 already pencils in 106% (\$239.1 bn). KSE Institute projects debt to peak near 110% of GDP in 2027 before easing post-war as external support normalises and growth resumes; prolonged hostilities into 2027 would push the ratio higher.

## GENERAL INFORMATION

**Ukraine's state debt position deteriorated further in 2025, reflecting the continued fiscal pressures of the full-scale war.** Wartime defense and budget needs have fueled a deficit exceeding 17% of GDP throughout the years of the full-scale invasion, driving up government borrowing and expanding the overall debt burden. This pushed state and state-guaranteed debt to 101% of GDP – yet another unwelcome record in recent years – rising by 28.4% (\$47.2 bn) to \$213.3 bn. State debt dynamics in 2025 were shaped by new external borrowings and international financial assistance, continued domestic debt issuance, and the successful restructuring of legacy obligations. Debt growth was primarily driven by external debt, while domestic debt grew at a more moderate pace (see Figure 1). About 72.2% of the debt carries fixed rates.

FIGURE 1.

### State and State Guaranteed Debt Dynamics, \$ billion




Sources: Ministry of Finance, KSE Institute

\* GDP in 2025 corresponds to the official national forecast developed by the Ministry of Economy and used in the State Budget Law for 2026.

FIGURE 2.

### State and State Guaranteed Debt, Currency Structure and Share of FX Debt



Sources: Ministry of Finance, KSE Institute


**External borrowing remained vital for Ukraine’s macroeconomic and fiscal stability in 2025.** As a result, external debt grew by 39.6% (\$45.5 bn) to \$160.4 bn (see Figure 1). Whereas external financing previously relied on bilateral aid from individual countries, in 2025 it predominantly came through programmatic arrangements (multilateral facilities and pooled funds tied to reform commitments) such as ERA loans, the EU’s Ukraine Facility, and the IMF’s Extended Fund Facility, which together serve as the main sources of budget support.

**Domestic financing was primarily used to repay internal debt, ensuring moderate growth of domestic debt.** In 2025, domestic debt grew by 4.7% (\$2.1 bn) to \$46.4 bn. Net inflows from bond placements reached \$2.2 bn, with \$13.9 bn in gross issuance and \$11.7 bn in redemptions, resulting in a 118% rollover rate. The Ministry of Finance also executed government bonds exchange auctions totaling \$0.8 bn (UAH 35 bn) in 2025, which helped alleviate short-term repayment pressures on domestic state debt. These operations mark the beginning of a proactive domestic debt restructuring and long-term liability management strategy, in line with the approved Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy. Complementing this, the Public Financial Management Strategy envisages continued active market operations in the domestic market, with at least two government bond exchange auctions per year through 2026–2030.

**The increased reliance on external borrowings also affected the currency composition of the state debt.** The share of debt denominated in foreign currency (FX) rose from 75% in 2024 to 79% in 2025 (see Figure 2). Specifically, 45% of the debt was denominated in euros, while 23% was denominated in US dollars. Last year, the share of euro-denominated debt stood at 33%. This sharp increase reflects the EU’s dominant role as Ukraine’s primary creditor. By contrast, IMF funding came in smaller volumes, while US support primarily arrived as grants. As a result, the share of dollar-denominated debt declined by 4 p.p. in 2025.

FIGURE 3.

### Maturity and Cost of State Debt



Sources: Ministry of Finance, KSE Institute

**Attracting concessional loans from external partners and active debt management enabled a qualitative transformation of state debt, significantly improving its maturity and cost profile.** The average maturity of total state debt rose from 11.4 years in 2024 to 13.4 years in 2025. External debt maturity extended to 15.8 years, materially reducing refinancing risks. Concurrently, debt costs declined: the average cost of state debt fell from 5.1% in 2024 to 4.6% in 2025, with external debt costs dropping to 1.9%, driven by a higher share of concessional financing from partners (see Figure 3). These improvements substantially mitigate refinancing risks and bolster medium-term fiscal sustainability.


# BUDGET FINANCING

The deficit in 2025, including \$13.1 bn in grants, amounted to \$39.2 bn, which is 16% (\$5.4 bn) higher than in the previous year. Excluding grants, the deficit stood at \$52.4 bn, also higher than in 2024 (\$45.6 bn). Budget revenues (excl. grants) increased by 19.5% to \$78.9 bn in 2025, while expenditures expanded by 17.5% y-o-y to \$131.3 bn (see Figure 6). Defense spending remained the government’s top priority, with defense sector allocations holding at \$73.6 bn.

In 2025, just 60% of budget expenditures were funded by domestic revenues, not counting foreign grants as part of revenues. An additional 1.6% was financed internally through the issuance of domestic government bonds. The remaining needs were met by external sources: 10% from grants and the rest was covered by foreign loans.

FIGURE 4.

## State Budget Balance, \$ billion



Sources: Ministry of Finance, KSE Institute

International grants continued to serve as a major pillar of Ukraine’s budget revenues in 2025, comprising 14.3% of the total and underscoring the reliable nature of donor commitments. In 2025, Ukraine secured \$13.1 bn in external grants, marking an 11% increase from the \$11.8 bn received in 2024. \$12.1 bn of the grants came from the World Bank under the ERA mechanism, which provides financing guaranteed by revenues from frozen Russian assets.

# EXTERNAL DEBT

Despite a reduction in volumes by 6% y-o-y in 2025, external financing continued to play a pivotal role in budget deficit financing, as well as maintaining macroeconomic and fiscal stability. Gross external borrowings in 2025 amounted to \$44.5 bn (compared to \$47.3 bn in 2024). As of the end of 2025, approximately 75% of Ukraine's state and state-guaranteed debt is external. The European Union was Ukraine's most active financial partner in 2025, with around 40% of total state debt consisting of obligations to the European Union (see Figure 4). Overall, recent years have been marked by a shift from bilateral support to programmatic assistance, which pools funds from multiple countries and provides financing in exchange for implementing reforms. The largest source of external financing for the budget was G7 Initiative as ERA loans, Ukraine Facility from the EU, Extended Fund Facility program from IMF.

FIGURE 5.

## External Debt Dynamics, \$ billion



Sources: Ministry of Finance, KSE Institute

In 2025, the largest source of financial support for the budget was funds received under the ERA program.<sup>1</sup> During the year, Ukraine received nearly \$38 bn (incl. \$25.9 bn of loans and \$12.1 bn of grants) from the EU, UK, USA and Canada. The EU fully disbursed its €18.1 bn (\$20.5 bn) commitment under the ERA program, while remaining inflows from the US (via the World Bank) and Japan are still expected in 2026–2027. Most importantly, funds received under this mechanism are contingent loans. Servicing and repayment of ERA loans will be financed from non-budgetary sources, specifically revenues from frozen Russian assets, thereby imposing no additional debt burden on Ukraine. As of now, ERA loans account for 58.2% of total external financing received in 2025 and 17.8% of Ukraine's total debt.

<sup>1</sup> Emergency Revenue Acceleration (ERA) program is a \$50 bn financing program initiated by the G7 countries at the end of 2024. This mechanism provides financing secured by guarantees from the frozen assets of the Central Bank of Russia

**Financing received under the Ukraine Facility<sup>2</sup> was the second largest source of inflows in 2025.** In 2025, Ukraine received \$11.8 bn under the program – \$11.1 bn of loans and \$0.7 bn of grants – in 4 loan tranches and 2 grant tranches, following reviews. However, due to the failure to meet all required indicators during the year, Ukraine missed out on approximately \$2 bn (€1.8 bn). Ukraine is currently facing challenges in meeting established indicators, with 10 indicators remaining unfulfilled in Q4 2025 alone. Additionally, the new Ukraine Support Loan will likely include part of the support that will complement the Ukraine Facility, adding both extra financing and additional indicators to the Ukraine Plan. Thus, the program's conditions will be reviewed in the near future.

**In December 2025, the European Council approved a new support instrument for Ukraine: the Ukraine Support Loan.** It provides financial support to Ukraine totaling €90 bn for 2026–2027, and will be repaid by Ukraine only upon receiving reparations from Russia. Until then, Russian assets will remain frozen, with the EC reserving the right to utilize them for loan repayment. The proposed support will be structured in two components: €30 bn provided as general budget support and €60 bn allocated for military aid. Budget support will be provided in the form of macro-financial assistance, along with financial aid through the updated Ukraine Facility mechanism.

**The IMF also remained a major creditor last year, providing \$0.9 bn to meet Ukraine's financial needs.** This financing was received under the IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program, approved in March 2023. In 2025, Ukraine received two main tranches from the IMF as a result of the seventh review in March and the eighth review in July.

**On February 26, 2026, the IMF Executive Board approved a new 48-month Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement** for Ukraine totaling SDR 5.9 bn (approx. \$8.1 bn). The program will be monitored through a series of structural benchmarks covering key objectives, with twelve such benchmarks scheduled for 2026 and quarterly reviews governing disbursements. Ukraine has already received the first tranche of \$1.5 bn upon fulfilling prior actions, including the approval of the 2026 State Budget in line with program parameters, the adoption of a Cabinet of Ministers resolution ensuring equal conditions for VAT payers in competitive public procurement procedures, and the submission to Parliament of a draft new Labour Code incorporating changes to the definition of “employment” in line with international best practices. Subject to satisfactory performance, Ukraine is projected to receive an additional \$1.4 bn in 2026 (\$685.5 mn in June following the first quarter review, and \$685.9 mn in September following the first half-year review).

**Most loans obtained in 2025 were on concessional and favorable terms.** Repayments of loans under the Ukraine Facility incorporate a grace period of 11–12 years and may be eligible for compensation by European Union member states. Servicing and repayment of ERA loans will be financed from non-budgetary sources, including revenues from frozen Russian assets, thereby imposing no additional debt burden on Ukraine. This structure significantly lowers Ukraine's debt servicing costs and supports long-term fiscal sustainability, even amid rapid debt growth and substantial financing needs.

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<sup>2</sup> The Ukraine Facility program was approved by the European Parliament in February 2024. It is a €50 bn financial package spanning 2024–2027 that is made up of three components: direct budget support amounting to €38.3 bn (incl. €33 bn in loans and €5.3 bn in grants); a special investment instrument for risk coverage in priority sectors totaling €6.97 bn; and technical assistance for reforms and interest payments on loans, including previous ones, of €4.8 bn. The program encompasses over 150 indicators across 69 reform areas planned through 2027.

# DOMESTIC DEBT


In 2025, domestic borrowing served mainly to roll over maturing internal debt, keeping domestic debt growth moderate. Adequate volumes of external financing allowed the government to limit reliance on domestic debt issuance, which remains costlier and less favorable compared to concessional external credits. Net budget inflows from domestic government bond placements totaled \$2.2 bn – gross proceeds reached \$13.9 bn, with \$11.7 bn redeemed. The domestic debt rollover rate reached 118% across all currencies and 131% in the hryvnia segment.

In 2025, the average yield on hryvnia-denominated bonds rose from 15.98% in 2024 to 16.24%. The average yield on euro-denominated bonds stood at 3.22%, while yields on dollar-denominated bonds declined from 4.64% to 4.17%. Among foreign currency instruments, dollar-denominated bonds with roughly 1.5-year maturities and an average yield of 4.17% saw the strongest demand.

The volume of government bonds issued in 2025 amounted to \$13.3 bn, a 10.4% decrease y-o-y. As a result, total government bond holdings reached almost \$47.1 bn in 2025, up 11% nominally. \$2.4 bn (17.9% of total issued bonds) represented benchmark domestic government debt securities, which banks can use to cover their mandatory reserve requirements.<sup>3</sup> This aims to stimulate bank participation in Ministry of Finance auctions for domestic government bonds, ensuring budget financing without reliance on monetary financing. By the end of the year, banks retained their leading 48% portfolio share, growing holdings by 14%, reflecting sustained demand for government securities as the least risky domestic asset class under prevailing conditions.

FIGURE 6.

## Domestic bond holdings, % total



Sources: NBU, KSE Institute

<sup>3</sup> Since 2024, banks have been permitted to use benchmark government bonds to cover up to 60% of their mandatory reserve requirements.

**Throughout the year, demand for government bonds from legal entities and individuals exhibited steady growth.** This consistent trend reflects increasing participation by citizens and companies in supporting public finances. Individual investors recorded the fastest growth, with holdings rising by 42.5%. Individuals' share in the domestic government bond portfolio increased by 1.5 p.p. in 2025 to 5.7%. Corporate demand also rose: legal entities' investments grew by 19% y-o-y, and their share in the domestic government bond portfolio increased by 1.4 p.p. to 12%. Rising public interest likely stems from limited investment alternatives, higher bond yields relative to available options, tax exemptions on bond income, and simplified access to investing.

The policy of avoiding deficit monetization through NBU purchases of government bonds, combined with robust growth in participation from other investors, has resulted in a reduced share of bond holdings owned by the NBU. At the same time, the NBU's share of outstanding domestic bonds declined further to 35%. This evolution signals reduced NBU dependence. Non-resident participation continued to decline in 2025, falling a further 0.3 p.p. to approximately 0.8% of the total portfolio (see Figure 5).

## | DEBT MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS

**With public debt reaching historic highs, the government has placed debt management at the core of its policy agenda to support fiscal stability.** The government has approved the Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy and continues to take active measures to keep its debt obligations under control.

**In December, the government successfully completed the restructuring of state derivative liabilities (GDP warrants).** The operation garnered 99% investor support, fully replacing this high-fiscal-risk instrument with predictable debt obligations. Under the restructuring terms, GDP warrants totaling \$2.6 bn were exchanged for new Series C bonds maturing in 2032 with a total value of \$3.5 bn, as well as Series B bonds maturing in 2030 and 2034, each valued at \$16.9 mn. All GDP warrants were canceled. According to Ministry of Finance estimates, without this restructuring, payments under GDP warrants for 2025–2041 could have reached \$6–20 bn, depending on economic growth rates. Consequently, potential payments for 2025–2041 were substantially reduced, enhancing debt sustainability and fiscal policy predictability. The operation's successful execution promptly resulted in upgrades to Ukraine's principal credit ratings.

**Switch auctions have emerged as a new instrument of active domestic debt management.** These auctions enable the redemption of domestic government bonds without drawing down funds from the unified treasury account, while also enhancing the liquidity of financial instruments currently circulating in the market. In 2025, the Ministry of Finance conducted its first government bond exchange auctions, with total exchanges reaching \$0.8 bn (UAH 35 bn) during the year, helping to reduce near-term redemption pressures on domestic government debt.

## DEBT SERVICE

Ukraine spent 11% (\$8.7 bn) of budget revenues (excl. grants) on interest payments for domestic and external state debt in 2025 (see Table 2). The cost of domestic borrowing in 2025 was considerably higher than that of external borrowing, with 70% of this amount going into the servicing of domestic debt. This divergence reflects the deferral of commercial debt obligations, the favorable concessional terms of recent external financing inflows, and persistently high interest rates in the domestic currency market. It underscores the prudence of the authorities' debt management strategy, which prioritizes concessional external borrowing to safeguard debt sustainability and fiscal space. This policy mitigates servicing costs, curtails rollover risks, and bolsters predictability in debt dynamics. As a result, Ukraine spent 10.9% of GDP or \$23 bn on the service (interest and principal payments) of state debt in 2025, which is in line with spending amounts in previous years.

## STATE GUARANTEED DEBT

The state-guaranteed debt of Ukraine continued its gradual decline, falling from \$6.9 bn at the end of 2024 to \$6.5 bn by the end of 2025. Volumes and the share of state-guaranteed debt have steadily declined over the past four years, primarily driven by a policy shift regarding state guarantees, with the government restricting the issuance of new guarantees to state-owned enterprises.

NPC "Ukrenergo" reached an agreement on the terms of a debt management operation for state-guaranteed green sustainable development bonds. In 2021, Ukrenergo issued its debut \$825 mn five-year green sustainability-linked Eurobonds (6.875% yield), the largest non-sovereign and green issuance by a Ukrainian entity. Payments were deferred in 2022 to ensure wartime financial stability. In November 2024, per IMF memorandum and government decision, payments were suspended, followed by negotiations culminating in a debt restructuring agreement. Under the agreement, creditors will be offered two options: selling their bonds at auction for up to 65.125% of face value (including accrued and overdue interest), funded by Ukrenergo raising \$430 mn on international markets; or exchanging existing bonds for new unguaranteed Ukrenergo bonds maturing in December 2031 at an elevated 8.5% annual coupon.

In 2025, NJSC "Naftogaz Ukraine" secured new state-guaranteed loans from the EBRD totaling €770 mn to replenish gas storage facilities. In April, Ukraine and the EBRD signed an agreement to bolster energy resilience, providing €270 mn under state guarantees, complemented by a €140 mn grant from Norway, enabling Naftogaz to import substantial natural gas volumes ahead of the next heating season. In August, Naftogaz and the EBRD inked a record €500 mn facility – the bank's largest project in Ukraine – backed by an EU guarantee covering 90% of the loan (without Ukrainian state backing).

At the fourth URC 2025, Ukrainian state-owned banks concluded a record €1.5 bn in agreements with international partners. The core instruments are EBRD unfunded portfolio risk-sharing guarantees covering 40–50% of credit risk on new sub-loan portfolios, unlocking up to €900 mn in lending to PrivatBank and Ukrgasbank, and direct EIB on-lending loans backed by EU guarantees, including a €100 mn facility for Ukreximbank and €50 mn for Oschadbank (part of the Ukraine Facility Investment Fund). Under EBRD facilities, losses upon sub-borrower default are absorbed in sequence: first by EU/French first-loss coverage and then by the EBRD guarantee, with residual risk remaining on the partner bank's balance sheet. While these instruments do not constitute direct state debt, they represent material contingent liabilities: all four banks are 100% state-owned, meaning impairing bank solvency would require recapitalization from the budget.

# COUNTRY CREDIT RATING

On December 22, 2025, Fitch Ratings upgraded Ukraine's Long-Term Foreign-Currency (LTFC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CCC' from 'Restricted Default.' This upgrade of Ukraine's IDR reflects the normalization of commercial creditor relations, the restructuring of GDP warrants, and the approval of a new EU Support Program. However, the ongoing war (Fitch does not expect a near-term reduction in hostilities despite current efforts to reach a ceasefire), weak institutional capacity, uneven application of the rule of law, and a high level of corruption restrain rating improvement.


On January 22, 2026, S&P Global Ratings also raised Ukraine's long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating from 'SD' (selective default) to 'CCC+'; the outlook is stable. Ukraine had been rated 'SD' since August 2024, after launching negotiations to restructure its external debt and declaring a moratorium on interest payments. The upgrade follows the December 2025 exchange of Ukraine's GDP warrants for new securities maturing in 2032. S&P also assigned the new instruments a 'CCC+' rating. S&P expects high-intensity hostilities to continue through 2026. The rating could be downgraded if the security situation deteriorates further.

# DEBT ACCUMULATION OUTLOOK

State debt is expected to grow over the medium term. The Budget Declaration for 2026–2028 establishes the medium-term debt policy target of maintaining the total debt-to-GDP ratio at or below 100%. Accordingly, the government does not anticipate a near-term reduction in public debt levels. However, under the Law on the State Budget for 2026, public and state-guaranteed debt is projected at \$239.1 bn (106% of GDP), significantly exceeding medium-term planning targets. The government projects that state debt in 2026 will increase solely due to the growth of external public debt. According to government plans, domestic debt will decline, as planned repayments of domestic debt are expected to exceed the volume of new domestic borrowings.

FIGURE 7.

## State Debt Forecast, % of GDP



The government continues to adhere to a policy of gradual reduction in the volume of state guarantees. For 2026, the maximum volume of state guarantees provided based on government decisions is set at 2.5% of the planned revenues of the general fund of the budget (\$1.4 bn). For comparison, this indicator was approved at 3% of planned revenues in 2025. Thus, state-guaranteed debt is also likely to continue declining in 2026.

**According to the KSE Institute [Ukraine Macroeconomic Handbook, Q1 2026](#), state debt will increase to almost 110% of GDP by 2027, before moderately easing when less foreign support is received and GDP growth accelerates after the end of the war.** Thus, the KSE forecast for 2026 aligns with government plans. However, KSE Institute estimates for 2027–2028 significantly exceed those outlined in the Declaration, which likely represent an aspirational scenario and target benchmark (see Figure 7).

## STRATEGIC AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

**Throughout 2025, the government pursued active debt management strategies to safeguard debt sustainability.** On December 24, the government **approved** the Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy for 2026–2028, which aims to ensure fiscal and debt sustainability and predictability of debt policy, strengthen trust among international partners and investors, and reduce key debt risks such as high borrowing costs, refinancing and liquidity risks, and exposure to currency fluctuations. Key priorities include increasing the share of grants and non-debt financing, mitigating debt risks through cost and maturity optimization, and fostering investor relations alongside development of the domestic government bond market as a tool for economic recovery.

**Another strategic document shaping public debt management during the forecasting period is the Public Financial Management Reform Strategy for 2026–2030,** approved in February 2026. A centerpiece of the Strategy is the establishment of a dedicated Debt Agency, expected to become operational by 2027, which is intended to strengthen the institutional capacity for sovereign debt management. The Strategy also sets out the harmonization of state and local government debt management with EU standards, including capacity-building support for local authorities through targeted training. On the domestic market side, the Strategy envisages measures to enhance the attractiveness of government securities, with the aim of broadening and diversifying the domestic investor base. Additionally, the Strategy provides for active liability management operations in the domestic market, with at least two government bond exchange auctions per year through 2026–2030, consistent with the priorities set out in the Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy.

TABLE 1.

## State Debt and State Guaranteed Debt of Ukraine, USD bn

	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	% of Total	Change over 2025	Change, %
<b>Total amount of state debt and state guaranteed debt</b>	98.0	111.4	145.3	166.1	213.3		47.2	28.4%
<b>State Debt</b>	<b>86.6</b>	<b>101.6</b>	<b>136.6</b>	<b>159.2</b>	<b>206.8</b>	<b>97.0%</b>	<b>47.6</b>	<b>29.9%</b>
Domestic Debt	39.0	38.0	41.8	44.3	46.4	21.8%	2.1	4.7%
Government securities issued at the domestic market	38.9	38.0	41.8	44.3	46.4	21.8%	2.1	4.7%
Other liabilities	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0%
External Debt	47.7	63.6	94.8	114.9	160.4	75.2%	45.5	39.6%
IFO Loans and Bilateral loans	22.9	39.3	70.5	95.2	136.5	64.0%	41.3	43.4%
<i>EU</i>	5.0	12.4	32.9	44.0	82.7	38.8%	38.7	88.0%
<i>IBRD</i>	6.3	7.7	12.0	16.2	16.5	7.7%	0.3	1.9%
<i>IMF</i>	8.8	10.6	14.2	17.7	17.9	8.4%	0.2	1.1%
<i>Canada</i>	0.0	1.8	3.7	5.1	5.3	2.5%	0.2	3.9%
<i>Other IFO and bilateral loans</i>	2.8	6.8	7.7	12.2	14.1	6.6%	1.9	15.6%
Eurobonds	22.9	22.7	22.8	18.2	21.8	10.2%	3.6	19.8%
External banks or commercial loans	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.5	2.1	1.0%	0.6	40.0%
<b>State Guaranteed Debt</b>	<b>11.3</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>3.0%</b>	<b>-0.4</b>	<b>-5.8%</b>
Domestic Guaranteed Debt	1.8	2.0	1.8	1.7	1.5	0.7%	-0.2	-11.8%
Domestic banks or commercial loans	1.2	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.5	0.7%	0.0	-6.3%
<i>Portfolio Guarantees</i>	0.1	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.4%	0.0	0.0%
Securities issued at the domestic market	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2%	0.0	0.0%
External Guaranteed Debt	9.5	7.9	6.9	5.2	5.0	2.3%	-0.2	-3.8%
IFO Loans	6.8	5.2	4.2	3.2	3.0	1.4%	-0.2	-6.3%
<i>IMF</i>	5.6	3.7	2.1	1.1	0.4	0.2%	-0.7	-63.6%
<i>EBRD</i>	0.3	0.6	1.1	1.1	1.6	0.8%	0.5	45.5%
<i>IBRD</i>	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.2%	0.0	-3.9%
<i>Other liabilities</i>	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.2%	0.0	4.1%
Securities issued at the external market (Bonds of Ukravtodor and Ukrenergo)	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.8	0.8	0.4%	0.0	0.0%
External banks or commercial loans	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.5%	0.0	-1.0%
Other liabilities	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0%	0.0	0.0%
<b>% of GDP</b>								
Total amount of state debt and state guaranteed debt	49.0	68.8	81.3	87.1	100.9			
<b>State Debt</b>	<b>43.4</b>	<b>62.7</b>	<b>76.4</b>	<b>83.5</b>	<b>97.8</b>			
<b>State Guaranteed Debt</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>6.1</b>	<b>4.9</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>3.1</b>			

Sources: Ministry of Finance, KSE Institute

TABLE 2.

**Government Debt Redemptions, Factual and Projection for 2025, USD bn**

	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
<b>Interest payments</b>	5.3	4.9	6.8	7.8	9.5	9.0
<b>Domestic</b>	3.5	3.6	5.5	5.2	6.1	6.0
<b>External</b>	1.8	1.3	1.3	2.6	3.4	3.0
<i>% of GDP</i>	2.7	3.0	3.8	4.1	4.5	4.0
<i>% of Budget Revenues</i>	11.2	8.9	9.3	10.0	10.3	14.2
<i>% of Budget Revenues w/o Grants</i>	11.2	12.2	11.1	11.8	12.0	14.3
<i>% of Budget Revenues w/o Grants, Domestic</i>	7.5	9.0	8.9	7.9	7.7	9.6
<i>% of Budget Revenues w/o Grants, External</i>	3.8	3.2	2.2	3.9	4.3	4.8
<b>Principal and Interest payments</b>	21.0	19.0	18.7	35.4	22.7	21.2
<b>Domestic</b>	15.7	16.2	15.6	14.7	16.1	15.4
<b>External</b>	5.3	2.7	3.2	20.7	6.6	5.8
<i>% of GDP</i>	10.5	11.7	10.5	18.6	10.7	9.4
<i>% of GDP, Domestic</i>	7.9	10.0	8.7	7.7	7.6	6.8
<i>% of GDP, External</i>	2.6	1.7	1.8	10.9	3.1	2.6

Sources: Ministry of Finance, NBU, KSE Institute